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BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
Department of State
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•January 1979
he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 79 / Number 2022
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Department of State
bulletin
Volume 79 / Number 2022 / January 1979
Cover Photos:
President Carter Secretary Vance Warren Christopher Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Charles William Maynes
The Department of State Bulletin, published by the Office of Public Com- munication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and govern- ment agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congres- sional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department of- ficials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press re- leases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.
The Secretary of State has deter- mined that the publication of this peri- odical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been ap- proved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through January 31, 1981.
NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items con- tained herein may be reprinted. Cita- tion of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appre- ciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera- ture.
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CYRUS R. VANCE
Secretary of State
HODDING CARTER III
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
COLLEEN SUSSMAN Assistant Editor
CONTENTS
30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Remarks by President Carter, Secretary Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Patricia M. Derian
Bill of Rights Day, Hitman Rights Day and Week, 1978 (Proclamation)
Basic Human Rights Documents
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Biographic Data)
THE PRESIDENT
8 News Conferences of Nov. 9 and 30 and Dec. 12
THE SECRETARY
12 The U.S. -European Partnership 16 Question-and-Answer Session Follow- ing London Address
AFRICA
18 U.S. Policy Toward South Africa (Anthony Lake)
CANADA
21
Secretary Vance Visits Canada (Donald Jamieson, Secretary Vance)
23 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
1978
DEPARTMENT
24 New State Department Liaison Office
With U.S. State and Local Govern- ments (White House Announcement)
EAST ASIA
25 U.S. Normalizes Relations With the
People's Republic of China (Presi- dent Carter, Texts of Joint Com- munique and U.S. Statement)
ECONOMICS
27 The Role of Exports in U.S. Foreign Policy (Warren Christopher)
30 The U.S. and the Third World: Partners or Plaintiffs? (David D. Newsom)
33 Multinational Corporations (Foreign
Relations Outline)
EUROPE
34 NATO Ministerial Meeting Held in
Brussels (Warren Christopher, Text of Final Communique)
36 Constitutional Referendum in Spain
(President Carter)
37 President Carter To Attend Guadeloupe
Meeting
MIDDLE EAST
38 Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II (Joint Press Statement)
38 Morocco — A Profile
39 Secretary Vance's Middle East Visit
NUCLEAR POLICY
39 The U.S. Approach to Non- proliferation — Are We Making Progress? (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.)
44 U.S. Policy on Reprocessing of U.S.- Origin Nuclear Material (Joseph S. Nye. Jr.)
UNITED NATIONS
46 What's Wrong With the U.N. and What's Right? (Charles William Maynes)
50 U.N. Committee on the Palestinian
People (Abraham A. Rihicoff, Andrew Young)
51 Namibia (William H. Barton, Text of
Resolution)
52 Arms Control (Adrian S. Fisher)
53 U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control
(President Carter) 55 Summaries of U.S. Statements
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
57 Nicaragua ( Warren Christopher)
58 U.S. -Brazil Joint Group on Energy
Technology (Joint Communique)
TREATIES
59 Current Actions
61 PRESS RELEASES
PUBLICATIONS
62 1949 "Foreign Relations'' Volume
VIII— "The Far East: China"
INDEX
President Carter addresses a group of domestic and international civil and human rights leaders in the East Room of the White House.
30th ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
At a ceremony at the White House on December 6, 1978, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, President Carter addressed a group of domestic and international civil and human rights leaders. His remarks followed those by Secretary Vance; Zbigniew Brzezinski. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and Patricia M. Derian, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.
PRESIDENT CARTER1
What I have to say today is funda- mentally very simple. It's something I've said many times, including my ac- ceptance speech when I was nominated as President and my inaugural speech when I became President. But it cannot be said too often or too firmly or too strongly.
As long as I am President, the Gov- ernment of the United States will con- tinue, throughout the world, to enhance human rights. No force on Earth can separate us from that commitment.
This week we commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights. We rededicate ourselves — in the words of Eleanor Roosevelt, who was the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission — to the Universal Declaration as, and I quote from her, "... a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all na- tions."
The Universal Declaration — and the human rights conventions that derive from it — do not describe the world as it is. But these documents are very im- portant, nonetheless. They are a bea- con, a guide to a future of personal se- curity, political freedom, and social justice.
For millions of people around the globe that beacon is still quite distant — a glimmer of light on a dark horizon of deprivation and repression. The reports of Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the International League for Human Rights, and many other non- governmental human rights organiza- tions amply document the practices and conditions that destroy the lives and the spirit of countless human beings. Political killings, tortures, arbitrary and prolonged detention without trial or without a charge — these are the crudest and the ugliest of human rights violations.
Of all human rights, the most basic is to be free of arbitrary violence — whether that violence comes from gov- ernments, from terrorists, from crimi-
nals, or from self-appointed messiahs operating under the cover of politics or religion.
But governments — because of their power which is so much greater than that of an individual — have a special responsibility. The first duty of a gov- ernment is to protect its own citizens, and when government itself becomes the perpetrator of arbitrary violence against its citizens, it undermines its own legitimacy.
There are other violations of the body and the spirit which are especially destructive of human life. Hunger, dis- ease, poverty are enemies of human potential which are as relentless as any repressive government. The American people want the actions of their government — our government — both to reduce human suffering and to increase human freedom.
That's why, with the help and en- couragement of many of you in this room, I have sought to rekindle the beacon of human rights in American foreign policy. Over the last 2 years we've tried to express these human concerns as our diplomats practice their craft and as our nation fulfills its own international obligations. We will speak out when individual rights are violated in other lands. The Universal Declaration means that no nation can draw the cloak of sovereignty over torture, disappearances, officially sanctioned bigotry, or the destruction of freedom within its own borders.
The message that is being delivered by all our representatives abroad — whether they are from the Department of State or Commerce or Agriculture or Defense or whatever — is that the policies regarding human rights count very much in the character of our own relations with other individual coun- tries.
In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance programs, we will demonstrate that our deepest af- finities are with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path to de- velopment. Toward regimes which per- sist in wholesale violations of human
rights, we will not hesitate to convey our outrage nor will we pretend that our relations are unaffected.
In the coming year, I hope that Con- gress will take a step that has been long overdue for a generation — the ratifica- tion of the Convention on the Preven- tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
As you know the genocide conven- tion was also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly 30 years ago this week — one day before the adoption of the Universal Declaration. It was the world's affirmation that the lesson of the Holocaust would never be forgot- ten, but unhappily, genocide is not pe- culiar to any one historical era.
Eighty-three other nations have ratified the genocide convention. The United States — despite the support of every President since 1948 — has not. In international meetings at the United Nations and elsewhere, when I meet with foreign leaders, we are often asked why. We do not have an accept- able answer.
I urge the U.S. Senate to observe this anniversary in the only appropriate way — by ratifying the genocide con- vention at the earliest possible date.
This action must be the first step to- ward the ratification of other human rights instruments, including those I signed a year ago. Many of the reli- gious and human rights groups repre- sented here have undertaken a cam- paign of public education on behalf of these covenants. I commend and ap- preciate your efforts.
Refugees are the living, homeless casualties of one very important failure on the part of the world to live by the principles of peace and human rights. To help these refugees is a simple human duty. As Americans — as a people made up largely of the descen- dants of refugees — we feel that duty with special keenness.
Our country will do its utmost to ease the plight of stranded refugees from Indochina and from Lebanon and of released political prisoners from Cuba and from elsewhere. I hope that we will always stand ready to welcome more than our fair share of those who flee their homelands because of racial, religious, or political oppression.
The effectiveness of our human rights policy is now an established fact. It has contributed to an atmosphere of change — sometimes disturbing — but
Department of State Bulletin
which has encouraged progress in many ways and in many places. In some countries, political prisoners have been released by the hundreds, even thousands. In others, the brutality of repression has been lessened. In still others there's a movement toward democratic institutions or the rule of law when these movements were not previously detectable.
To those who doubt the wisdom of our dedication. I say this: Ask the vic- tims. Ask the exiles. Ask the govern- ments which continue to practice re- pression. Whether in Cambodia or Chile, in Uganda or South Africa, in Nicaragua or Ethiopia or the Soviet Union, governments know that we in the United States care; and not a single one of those who is actually taking risks or suffering for human rights has ever asked me to desist in our support of basic human rights. From the pris- ons, from the camps, from the enforced exiles, we receive one message — speak up, persevere, let the voice of freedom be heard.
I'm very proud that our nation stands for more than military might or politi- cal might. It stands for ideals that have their reflection in the aspirations of peasants in Latin America, workers in Eastern Europe, students in Africa, and farmers in Asia.
We do live in a difficult and compli- cated world — a world in which peace is literally a matter of survival. Our foreign policy must take this into ac- count. Often, a choice that moves us toward one goal tends to move us fur- ther away from another goal.
Seldom do circumstances permit me or you to take actions that are wholly satisfactory to everyone. But I want to stress again that human rights are not peripheral to the foreign policy of the United States. Our human rights policy is not a decoration. It is not something we've adopted to polish up our image abroad or to put a fresh coat of moral paint on the discredited policies of the past.
Our pursuit of human rights is part of a broad effort to use our great power and our tremendous influence in the service of creating a better world — a world in which human beings can live in peace, in freedom, and with their basic needs adequately met. Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy. And I say this with assurance, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood.
For the most part, other nations are held together by common racial or ethnic ancestry or by a common creed or religion or by ancient attachments to the land that go back for centuries of time. Some nations are held together
by the forces, implied forces, of a tyrannical government. We are differ- ent from all of those, and I believe that we in our country are more fortunate.
As a people we come from every country and every corner of the Earth. We are of many religions and many creeds. We are of every race, every color, every ethnic and cultural back- ground. We are right to be proud of these things and of the richness that lend to the texture of our national life. But they are not the things which unite us as a single people.
What unites us — what makes us Americans — is a common belief in peace, in a free society, and in a com- mon devotion to the liberties enshrined in our Constitution. That belief and that devotion are the sources of our sense of national community. Uniquely, ours is a nation founded on an idea of human rights. From our own history we know how powerful that idea can be.
Next week marks another human rights anniversary — Bill of Rights Day. Our nation was "conceived in lib- erty," in Lincoln's words, but it has taken nearly two centuries for that lib- erty to approach maturity.
For most of the first half of our his- tory, black Americans were denied even the most basic human rights. For most of the first two-thirds of our his- tory, women were excluded from the political process. Their rights and those of native Americans are still not con- stitutionally guaranteed and enforced. Even freedom of speech has been threatened periodically throughout our history. Only in the last 10-12 years have we achieved what Father Hes- burgh has called "the legal abandon- ment of more than three centuries of apartheid." [Father Theodore Hes- burgh. President of Notre Dame, is past Chairman of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and now President of the Rockefeller Foundation.] And the struggle for full human rights for all Americans — black, brown, and white, male and female, rich and poor — is far from over.
To me, as to many of you, these are not abstract matters or ideas. In the rural Georgia country where I grew up, the majority of my own fellow citizens were denied many basic rights — the right to vote, the right to speak freely without fear, the right to equal treat- ment under the law. I saw at firsthand the effects of a system of deprivation of rights. I saw the courage of those who resisted that system. And finally, I saw the cleansing energies that were re- leased when my own Vegion of this country walked out of darkness and into what Hubert Humphrey in the year
of the adoption of the Universal Dec- laration called "the bright sunshine of human rights. "
The American Bill of Rights is 187 years old and the struggle to make it a reality has occupied every one of those 187 years. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is only 30 years old. In the perspective of history, the idea of human rights has only just been broached.
I do not draw this comparison be- cause I want to counsel patience. I draw it because I want to emphasize, in spite of difficulties, steadfastness and commitment.
One hundred and eighty-seven years ago, as far as most Americans were concerned, the Bill of Rights was a bill of promises. There was no guarantee that those promises would ever be ful- filled. We did not realize those prom- ises by waiting for history to take its inevitable course. We realize them be- cause we struggled. We realized them because many sacrificed. We realized them because we persevered.
For millions of people around the world today the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is still only a decla- ration of hope. Like all of you, I want that hope to be fulfilled. The struggle to fulfill it will last longer than the lifetimes of any of us; indeed, it will last as long as the lifetime of humanity itself. But we must persevere. And we must persevere by insuring that this country of ours, leader in the world which we love so much, is always in the forefront of those who are strug- gling for that great hope, the great dream of universal human rights.
SECRETARY VANCE2
We are gathered here to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Universal Dec- laration of Human Rights. This historic document embodies the fundamental tenet that international law creates ob- ligations which all governments owe to their citizens, and it helps define uni- versally recognized principles of human rights.
In the three decades since the birth of the declaration, the United Nations has built on these principles in other important human rights agreements — the genocide convention; the conven- tion on racial discrimination; the Inter- national Covenant on Civil and Politi- cal Rights; and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights. Together with the Universal Declaration, these docu- ments create an international legal structure with protection of individual rights.
January 1979
I hope that the U.S. Senate will soon approve the genocide convention and undertake early hearings to permit ratification of the other three instru- ments.
International law, as reflected in these agreements and covenants, has guided this Administration's human rights policy. Although the policy re- flects basic American ideals, it is not an attempt to impose uniquely Ameri- can values.
The rights about which we are concerned — the right to be free from torture, to be free from arbitrary arrest, rights of political expression, the rights to basic economic needs — are recog- nized in the U.N. Charter and in other international agreements as being uni- versal in their application throughout the world.
We are gathered here today to re- dedicate ourselves to the principles of the Universal Declaration. As Members of Congress and leaders of private groups, your efforts have contributed to the creation of the basis in interna- tional law for protecting human rights. With your help, we will continue to work for their universal implementa- tion, and with your help we will con- tinue to advance the cause of human freedom everywhere.
DR. BRZEZINSKI
Let me make to you three basic prop- ositions regarding human rights and then develop them briefly.
The first is that human rights is the genuine historical inevitability of our times. The second is that human rights is a central facet in America's rele- vance to this changing world. And the third is that there has been progress in the effort to enhance the human condi- tion insofar as human rights are con- cerned.
Historical Inevitability
I started by saying that human rights is the genuine historical inevitability of our times. I used those words very de- liberately, for we live in an age very much influenced by concepts of his- torical inevitability. Indeed, one of the most powerful, moving concepts in world affairs today is the notion that there is a certain inevitability in his- torical progression toward a world rev- olution which is doctrinely defined, and that idea has had a powerful impact on global consciousness.
And yet, events increasingly are proving it wrong; the notion of world revolution is too simplistic a concept
for a world as diverse and as pluralistic as ours. It could only have been born in the narrow confines of 19th century Europe undergoing the early pang>. of the industrial revolution and then generalized from that basis allegedly in terms of universal relevance
What we are seeing today in the world is the increasing self assertiveness of man, the increasing political awakening of man, and thereby also the increasing assertion of the diversity of man. And thus, the concept of the world that some day will emerge based on a similar social- political organization achieved for a common revolutionary experience is becoming increasingly unreal. Indeed, many of the difficulties that today beset the Communist world in their own in- terstate relations are due to the funda- mental error of the basic historical as- sumption.
What is, however, becoming evident is that as man or mankind abandons his centuries-long lethargy, he begins to seek actively a meaningful and just — and I emphasize the word "just" — definition of the proper relationship between man and society and between society and government. It is an issue as old as political philosophy, but it is an issue which has been an esoteric one
BILL OF RIGHTS DAY, HUMAN RIGHTS DAY AND WEEK, 1978
A Proclamation*
Two great events in the history of human liberty will be commemorated in December: the ratification, on December 15, 1791, of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States, and the adoption, on De- cember 10. 1948, of the Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly.
The anniversary of the Bill of Rights re- minds us that our Nation is a continuing ex- periment in human freedom. Because of the Bill of Rights, we have been able to weather 187 years of tumultuous social and techno- logical change without losing our fundamen- tal liberties. Indeed, those liberties have ac- tually expanded in scope, and have grown to encompass a steadily larger proportion of our people. We can be proud of what we have achieved. But we cannot be complacent, for too many Americans are still denied a fair opportunity to enjoy the rights and rewards of our society. That is why Bill of Rights Day should be a day of rededication as well as of commemoration.
This year, we mark the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Declaration is the cornerstone of a
developing international consensus on human rights. It is also the authoritative statement of the meaning of the United Nations Charter, through which member nations undertake to promote, respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. without discrimination. A long and difficult road must be travelled before the reality of human rights in the world matches the words of the Declaration. The Declaration will light that road and give strength to all who follow it.
The Universal Declaration is the heart of a body of important United Nations human rights documents: the Convention on the Pre- vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul- tural Rights. The United States signed the Genocide Convention in 1948 and the Racial Discrimination Convention in 1966. I signed the other two Covenants on October 4. 1977. I hope that the United States Senate will soon approve the Genocide Convention at last, and will undertake early hearings to permit our Nation's adherence to the three remaining in- struments. There could be no more appro- priate gesture to mark the anniversary of the Universal Declaration.
I also signed the American Convention on Human Rights on June 1, 1977. I am proud that since then, eleven nations of the Americas have ratified it. thus bringing it into force.
The great and noble struggle to realize the rights of all men and women goes on. In the face of injustice and oppression, human be- ings continue to sacrifice and strive for jus- tice and for human dignity
Now, Therefore. I, Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim December 10, 1978, as Human Rights Day and December 15. 1978. as Bill of Rights Day. and call on all Ameri- cans to observe Human Rights Week begin ning December 10. 1978. Let us reaffirm our dedication to the promise of this Nation for all citizens. And let us renew our efforts as members of the world community on behalf of the human rights of all people everywhere.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my nana this twenty-eighth day of November, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-eight, and of the Independ- ence of the United States of America the two hundred and third.
Jimmy Carter
♦No. 4609 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec 4, 1978).
Department of State Bulletin
BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The declaration was the work of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights which met in January 1947 under the chairmanship of Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Universal Dec- laration of Human Rights they drew up was adopted and proclaimed by the General As- sembly on December 10. 1948. It was the first effort to set common standards of achievement in human rights for all peoples of all nations.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
Drawn up in the immediate wake of World War II, this convention forbids states or in- dividuals to commit acts with the specific intent to destroy, wholly or partially, a na- tional, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948; the United States signed it, and it was submitted to the Senate for ad- vice and consent to ratification in 1949 and resubmitted in 1970. Eighty-three nations are parties to the convention, but it has not yet been ratified by the United States. Hearings have been held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
The convention forbids racial and ethnic discrimination in all fields of public life. Its terms, for the most part, parallel U.S. con- stitutional and statutory law and policy. The convention was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1965; Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Na- tions, signed for the United States in 1966. One hundred and one nations have adhered to the convention. President Carter transmitted it to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification on February 23, 1978.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
The covenant affirms a series of standards in economic, social, and cultural activities. Formulated as statements of goals to be achieved progressively rather than im- mediately, these standards are in general ac- cord with U.S. law and practice. The coven- ant was adopted by the U.N. General Assem-
bly in 1966, and 54 nations are parties. The United States has signed it. and President Carter transmitted it to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on February 23, 1978.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Of the four U.N. treaties, this covenant is the most similar in conception to the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. It consists primarily of limitations upon the power of the state to impose its will on the people under its jurisdiction and, in large measure, guarantees those civil and political rights with which the United States and the Western democratic tradition have always been as- sociated. The covenant was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, and 52 na- tions are parties. The United States has signed it, and President Carter transmitted it to the Senate for advice and consent to ratifi- cation on February 23, 1978.
Optional Protocol
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1966. It is closely related to the covenant but is a separate treaty to which only 21 of the parties to the covenant have adhered.
American Convention on Human Rights ("Pact of San Jose")
The American convention, like the U.N. treaties, gives legally binding expression to human rights that are. for the most part, ac- cepted in U.S. law and practice. It was adopted by the Organization of American States in 1969 and was signed for the United States on June 1, 1977. Twelve countries of the OAS have ratified, and one country has adhered to, the convention. President Carter transmitted it to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification on February 23, 1978.
♦The full texts of these documents are printed in the Department of State's Selected Documents No. 5 (Revised), entitled "Human Rights." Copies of this 62-page Selected Documents may be obtained for $2.40 each from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, Washington, DC. 20402. (Orders of 100 or more copies of the same publication mailed to the same address are sold at a 25% discount.) Remittances in the form of a check or money order payable to the Superintendent of Documents must accompany orders.
of interest only to a few for much of the political history of mankind.
It is only in our age, indeed in our own lifespan, that this issue has dramatically surfaced on a global scale. And it has done so in a variety of ways. There is no doubt that the World Wars were tremendous catalysts for political awakening. There is no doubt that the spread of literacy and education has had an awakening impact on the politi- cal consciousness of men and women. There is no doubt that the achievement of new nations has given more mean- ingful political expression for one's quest for individual expression.
But the cumulative impact of that has been to make human rights the most central item on the global agenda. When I say "human rights," I recog- nize the fact that in a globally diverse world, in a culturally diverse world, there will be different emphases, and what we stress may be defined and ex- pressed differently in different parts of the world.
And yet there is a common theme to the aspirations and the yearnings of people — be it in Latin America or be it in the southern part of Africa or be it in the Middle East or be it in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union or be it in the Far East.
I found it to be remarkable that in the recent effervescence of political ex- pression in the central square in Peking — in a country as isolated as China has been for decades — one of the resounding cries was for Socialist de- mocracy, for freedom of expression; in effect for human rights, for a definition of the proper relationship among man and society and government.
This is the wave of the present. This is the central form in which mankind is expressing its new political awakening, and it is terribly important to recognize this. It is very important to be iden- tified with it, for it is, as I started to say, the genuine historic inevitability of our time.
That brings me to my second point, namely, that it is a central facet of our relevance to the changing world.
Relevance to the Changing World
Consider the circumstances in which this country was born — a small group of colonies, 13 on the eastern seaboard; isolated by weeks distance, by more time than it takes you today to get to the Moon. It had one thing in common, however, with another small sector of humanity, that part of humanity which lived at the time in western Europe. And in both places there was an idea which was up in the air, which was percolating in the intellectual world,
mary 1979
and that was the idea of personal lib- erty. It was a new idea fundamentally and an increasingly important and powerful idea.
What is unique about this country is that it was the first country ever in the history of mankind to consciously come together and shape itself around a central philosophical idea; namely, the idea of the independence and freedom of man.
I would not insist for a minute that by accomplishing our independence, by signing the Bill of Rights, we fulfilled that idea. Far from it. The next 200 years of our history has been one of an unending quest to make that idea a re- ality, and we did it through the strug- gles for suffrage, through the exten- sion of civil rights, through the break- ing of racial barriers, through the elimination of inequality between the sexes, through increasing the scope of political participation to groups hitherto excluded, such as the trade unions.
And the struggle still goes on. But the point is that we created a framework in our society which was congenial to the struggle and which legitimized it. And this is the genius of the historical success of America. And it is more than that. It is the key to America's relevance to the world, for we are not just a geographical entity. We do not have, as other nations, an organic past which we share. We are united together by a compact with the future, and it brings us together be- cause we share certain common ideals.
This is what makes us Americans ul- timately. We are Americans because we do not share a past, but we share a future. We share a future which is as- sociated with certain fundamental philosophical assumptions about what is the nature of man and, to repeat, what is the proper relationship among man, society, and government.
Today, these ideas are becoming universal in their appeal, and it is, therefore, just and right, morally cor- rect, historically well-grounded and politically useful — and I am not hesi- tant in saying that — for the United States to carry high the standard of human rights, for we are then in the forefront of a powerful movement which, indeed, has worldwide appeal. And we gain from it.
We first of all redeem our own es- sence. We rededicate ourselves to our inner meaning when we commit our- selves as Americans, and we greatly enhance the appeal of this country worldwide.
American foreign policy depends not on material wealth or financial power — and neither of these should be
underestimated — but it also depends a great deal on the spiritual attraction as well, and that attraction traditionally has been scorned. It has waned in re- cent years. One of the things of which I am particularly proud is to be as- sociated with a President who has done so much to revitalize that significant element of America's relevance to the world.
I think it has already contributed to overcoming what was doubtless a crisis of the spirit in this society. That crisis of the spirit was derived from funda- mental divisions about proper courses of action, but this division of proper courses of action was also associated with profound moral and philosophical differences, the consequence of which was to generate in this society an his- torical sense of pessimism and moral unease.
Progress in Enhancing Human Rights
I think it is remarkable how much has been accomplished in 2 years to overcome that. We face enormous di- lemmas in world affairs, and each day compounds the difficulties. And yet we approach them again with a renewed sense of historical optimism and a sense of moral ease within ourselves. And that is terribly important, and it has to be differentiated from self- righteousness; it isn't self-right- eousness.
There are a great many things wrong with this society. But to realize — in spite of these wrongs which, within the framework of the Constitution we have created, we are trying to correct — we are associated with a basic yearning of man is a tremendous political asset. Thus, I would stress very heavily, very strongly, that in the context of this politically awakening world which is seeking readjustments in political and economic distribution of power, for us to be concerned with human rights is to be concerned with a central human concern and a human aspiration which is both real and just. That is a very powerful combination.
But beyond that, I would argue that on the practical level we have made progress. Patt [Derian], who has been directly involved in this, who has been in the forefront of this, will speak to it more precisely. But let me say just in general that we have succeeded in or- ganizing this government to be more sensitive to questions of human rights. We have now a structure — not a perfect one, to be sure, but a structure nonetheless — which makes certain that human rights concerns are given new consideration in the shaping of our
policy. That is a tangible and concrete expression.
Secondly, we have tried to increase global awareness of the importance of this issue, particularly in other gov- ernments that have to deal with us. And there is today not a government in the world that does not know that how it behaves in regard to human rights will affect its relationship with us. Again, I use my words advisedly — "will af- fect," not determine in its entirety, be- cause we have to be cognizant of the fact that there are other considerations also involved in dealing with other governments — regional interests, spe- cific bilateral interests, security con- cerns which may dictate different arrangements — even if these govern- ments in some cases are unresponsive.
But no government can today afford the luxury of thinking that we do not care and that it is entirely immune to some consequences if it is indifferent to the cause of human rights. And thus, I think on a practical global level we have made the issue of human rights a genuinely present issue on the global agenda.
I was struck, in traveling with the President to different parts of the world, with the extent to which even leaders initially skeptical about our human rights policy increasingly iden- tified themselves with the issue of human rights and addressed themselves to it — in most cases genuinely, in some cases less so. But even hypocrisy is ? bow to virtue, and the fact they felt compelled to acknowledge tnc human rights concept is not without signifi- cance.
Last year has seen some tangible progress in the human condition. There are different ways of assessing that progress. There are different groups which, from time to time, make esti- mates. Collating some of these reports together, we do have the impression that not because of our efforts, either alone or at all, but because of this in- creasing relevance of the human rights condition which we have helped to stimulate, there has been progress in a number of countries.
It is difficult to measure it but as a rough approximate estimate I would say in at least 40 countries around the world in which two and a half billion people live there has been tangible progress — in some cases more, in some cases less, in some cases certainly not enough, but progress nonetheless. And it has expressed itself in even greater respect for rights or less oppression of political opposition or in the release of victims or in a generally more sensitive attitude toward established procedures.
This is something of which we can
be proud, though of which we should not take credit. We are part of the process. We are part of a political and historical process, and we live in a time which is often short in hopeful perspectives in the future. I would submit to you that this is one of the more important reassuring ones be- cause it tells us something about what a human being is. It tells us that ulti- mately the human being in whatever the social, economic, or cultural con- ditions, yearns for something transcen- dental, yearns for some self-definition with respect to his uniqueness, yearns for something which dignifies him as a spiritual being. And if that, in fact, is increasingly the human condition, it ought to be a source of tremendous pride and reassurance to us as Ameri- cans.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN
To the how, why. and what of our policy, there generally are four ques- tions: How we are implementing it; why are we doing it, or why do we do what we do; and what has been achieved? Then the fourth one that never goes away is do we really mean it?
I think by the time this event is over, after hearing what we have just heard, after hearing the President's statement.
I think that maybe that question will be laid to rest forever. However, I do be- lieve that the integrity of the policy, the decisions we make in the name of the policy, will always be questioned. And I think, frankly, that that is a necessity, that people have to care enough about it to watch, to complain, to push, to press, to say this is what we want, this doesn't match our standard, we are not satisfied with it, do better, do better, do better.
If that doesn't continue, then 15 or 20 years down the pike this will just be something else that happened or still has a little office percolating some- where. It really depends on the people who are gathered here today. You are the human rights establishment. You are the authors of human rights in American foreign policy sitting right here in the front row.
There is no question that we have got it and that we intend to hang onto it. Just make sure that everybody else who comes wants to hang onto it or is caused to.
In our bilateral relations we discuss human rights issues formally with Presidents and Prime Ministers. This is a change. It used to be that this hap- pened quietly in the hall or over a glass of brandy or between sets on a tennis court, because human rights things were not generally thought to be possi- ble to discuss in diplomatic formal
Patricia M. Derian is the Assistant Secre- tary of State for Human Rights and Human- itarian Affairs. She was sworn in on June 17, 1977, as the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs; as a result of a reorganization in the Department of State in August 1977. she assumed the title of Assist- ant Secretary.
Ms. Derian, a native of Virginia, resided in Jackson, Mississippi, from 1959 until her present appointment. She attended Radford College in Virginia and is a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Nursing.
She has long been active in civil rights re- lated work and Democratic Party organiza- tion. She has served as the president of the Southern Regional Council and as an OEO project director. Ms. Derian was a member of the Executive Committee of the ACLU and a founder of the Mississippi Civil Liber- ties Union. She was a member of the Na- tional Prison Project Steering Committee, the Board of Directors of the Center for Commu- nity Justice, and the Mississippi Council on Human Relations.
In 1968 she was elected Mississippi's Democratic National Committeewoman and reelected in 1972 and 1976. She was one of the founders of the Loyalist Mississippi
Democratic Party and the Democratic Na- tional Committeewomen's Caucus.
During the presidential campaign she was an adviser to Jimmy Carter and a deputy di- rector of the Carter-Mondale campaign and served on the HEW policy planning group of the Carter-Mondale transition team.
Department of State Bulletin
negotiations. That has changed. That happens now.
People are still a little bit uneasy and nervous about it, because talking about torture and disappearances and no charges and no trials to the people who are responsible for those things hap- pening makes everybody a little un- easy. The ones you are talking to don't like to hear it, and the ones who are saying it are hoping that they can say it and get the message across and not erect such a barrier that no communi- cation can take place. But we are all learning how to do that.
Our approach has not been limited to quiet diplomacy. We have practiced vigorous diplomacy in which all avail- able instruments are used. They include symbolic affirmations of our concern. The President says something, the Secretary says something, it is in a speech, it is in a press conference, it is in a press release, it is in a casual comment, it is in a letter, it is whatever way you can find at some point when it seems like the right instrument to have a strong public gesture. When there is no response to quiet expression of human rights concerns and when there is no response to a symbolic speaking out, our law and our policy demand that we examine our assistance relationships, both economic and military.
We will continue to assert human rights concerns as vigorously as we have during the past 2 years in our dealings with all governments. The fundamental objective of this policy is to do what we can as a government and as a people to improve the observation of human rights by governments toward their people. That is essentially what it is that this policy is to do, and we do that in all the ways that you know.
At the same time, the human rights policy has another important effect; it strengthens our position and influence in the world. Human rights is an area where our ideals and our self-interest strongly coincide.
The fact of it is that that is a side effect and the only way we really get that side benefit is to be as straight as it is possible to be with our policy im- plementation. That is our intention. That is our endeavor. That is our con- stant struggle, because I don't need to tell anyone in this room that it is also incredibly complex to balance all of the things that are of great concern to the United States with all the other things. Human rights now sits at the table and that is a change.
Our well-being and security are en- hanced when there is greater respect for human rights in the world. Our policy is important to the health and integrity
January 1979
of this society within the United States. Support for or indifference to oppres- sion in other countries weakens the foundation of our democracy at home.
We have increased awareness of and concern for human rights among gov- ernments and peoples throughout the world and in international organiza- tions such as the United Nations.
Finally, besides growing awareness, there are indications of concrete prog- ress for many regions. The U.S. Gov- ernment is careful not to claim credit for influencing specific steps. When a country is making improvements, it is the result of decisions made by its gov- ernment and people. And how many events would have occurred in the ab- sence of U.S. human rights policy, we have no idea. But the policy has helped create a climate in which such changes are more likely.
I might just run down a few of these. In Africa three countries now under military rule have pledged themselves to hold elections and reestablish majority rule. They include Nigeria. Mali, and Ghana. Another, Upper Volta, has already returned to a mul- tiparty and civilian democratic system. Nigeria has called for the creation of an African human rights commission. And the African Bar Association, in its most recent meeting, called for greater re- spect for human rights and was moved to call for greater respect, because a person got up and wanted to speak against the human rights policy, whereupon the Bar Association took a very strong and principled position in favor of human rights.
In Asia, Indonesia has released 15,000 political prisoners over the past 18 months and has pledged to release all remaining over the next year. Thousands of political prisoners have been released in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Guinea, Bolivia, Haiti, and elsewhere.
India, the world's largest democ- racy, clearly rejected authoritarian rule in last year's election and is joined with us in pressing the cause of human rights.
In Latin America, the Dominican Republic held fair and open elections. Military regimes in Peru and Ecuador are moving to restore democracy. At its last meeting, the Organization of American States passed by an over- whelming majority a resolution to sup- port the advancement of human rights
and to strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The Commission has visited Panama, El Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua, and more trips are slated.
In NATO, every member of the Western alliance is a democracy. And in Eastern Europe, through the Bel- grade conference and other diplomatic channels, we continue to press the countries of the Warsaw Pact to abide by the Helsinki accords.
The Helsinki Final Act has assumed a life of its own. Monitoring groups help insure a full discussion of gaps between current practices and promises of Helsinki. There is no question that those monitoring groups have mighty hard sledding, and it is part of our re- sponsibility to speak on their behalf, to give them what support we can. and to at least supply an echo for those brave voices in those dreadful and frightening circumstances.
But the fact is that most of the prog- ress is yet to come. Legions of people all over the world suffer at the hands of their governments. Too many are im- prisoned without being charged. Their families often don't know where they are. They are certainly not tried in those circumstances. Too many are de- nied basic freedoms of expression, the right to participate in their government.
But we are really at the beginning, and we are hopeful that in all the years that it will take, that we will continue to see and be able to recount year after year a little more movement, a little more movement.
If we should find the time when we are able to make a lot of movement, that would be superb. But in the ab- sence of dramatic events — even in the presence of dramatic events — we must continue to press and press and press, just slug it out one day at a time.
I would like to end with a word about the U.S. refugee program, which is an integral part of our human rights policy.
There is special urgency today con- cerning the refugees from Indochina. Their desperate plight is underlined daily in the newspapers where there are reports of little boats sinking, people drowning, being pushed away, living out God knows what kind of future in a present that is an overcrowded refugee camp.
While every effort is made to make
the camps safe, habitable, the fact is that as these numbers increase, the camps are getting overcrowded, health conditions are becoming very serious, and food conditions are a problem, too.
The search of these refugees for temporary safe haven is an interna- tional problem demanding an interna- tional solution. With other govern- ments, the United States will take part in a high-level consultation on In- dochinese refugees in Geneva on De- cember 11 and 12 under the leadership of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Paul Hartling. We hope other governments will join us in in- creasing their level of acceptance of refugees, in providing material support for them in the countries where they first land, and for aiding in their per- manent resettlement.
For our part, the United States is in- creasing acceptance to an annual total of 54,000 in the months ahead. This total includes 25,000 authorized for parole earlier this year; 625 Cambodian refugees a month, following specific expressions of concern by the Con- gress; a special admission of 2,500 in response to the Hai Hong crisis when the refugee vessel was stranded off the coast of Malaysia; an additional 8,000 conditional entry numbers; and 15,000 for boat refugees on which parole ac- tion has been taken by the Attorney General in consultation with the Con- gress.
A final word on our commitment to ratification of the genocide and the other human rights covenants. They are crucial to the international credibility of this country's human rights policy. It is ludicrous for us to base an enor- mous part of our foreign policy on the fundamentals of human rights and fail to ratify the implementing instruments that are in the international world.
That is a little early lobbying for people who don't need it, but I hope that you will understand the commit- ment that this Administration has to it, certainly that many members of the Congress have to it. And it is now time for us to act. □
'Text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden- tial Documents of Dec. 1 1. 1978.
■Text of remarks by Secretary Vance. Dr. Brzezinski. and Assistant Secretary Derian taken from White House press release of Dec. 6.
Department of State Bulletin
THE PRESIDENT: News
Conferences of i¥oi?. 9 and 30
and Dec* 12 (Excerpts)
NOV. 9, KANSAS CITY1
Q. As you draw up the budget for next year, which you will be doing the next few weeks, you're facing the choice between, to some extent, guns and butter. We've committed to our NATO allies to let the military budget grow. At the same time, you want to hold down, decrease the Federal deficit to $30 billion or below.
Is it true, as reported, that you've decided to let the whole military budget grow by about 3% faster than the rate of inflation while ordering a $4 billion, $5 billion cut of the pro- jected gross of social programs? And if so, where are those cuts going to come from — Amtrak subsidies or Federal pensions or farm programs or where?
A. I've been working on the 1980 fiscal year budget for months. I had my first hearings, preliminary hearings, with the agency heads last April or May, and now almost daily, I meet with the Office of Management and Budget on future decisions to be made in the budget itself. I won't make final decisions on the fiscal year '80 budget until sometime next month, after meeting with the heads of the different agencies and departments of the Fed- eral Government to let them appeal, in effect, decisions that the OMB — Office of Management and Budget — and I have made together.
There's no way that I can cut down the ability of our nation to defend it- self. Our security obviously comes first. And we have encouraged our NATO allies in particular to increase their expenditures for a joint defense of Europe and, therefore, us by 3% a year above the inflation rate. I intend to honor that commitment. The final fig- ures, though, on individual depart- ments, and clearly the Defense De- partment, have not yet been decided.
I might point out I will meet my goal, which I announced in the anti- inflation speech a couple of weeks ago, of having a budget deficit less than half what it was when I was running for President. The budget deficit will be below $30 billion. It's going to be a very tight, very stringent, very difficult
budget to achieve, but I will achieve it. And I'm sure Congress will back me in this effort. I'm also continuing a freeze on hiring of Federal employees. I have limited this year, with the Congress approval, the pay increases for Federal employees — there is no increase at all for executives in the Federal Govern- ment. And I'll do other things as well to control inflation.
For texts of the Joint Com- munique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China, the President's address and remarks, and the U.S. statement of De- cember 15, 1978, see p. 25.
I consider it to be my top domestic commitment, and I don't intend to fail.
Q. Do you intend to sign the meat import bill, and if not, why not?
A. The bill has not gotten to my desk yet. And I expect to receive it tomor- row or Saturday. I'll make a decision then.
I might point out that I'm strongly in favor of the countercyclical approach to beef imports, where on a predictable basis, when the supply of beef in this country is high, that imports would be lower, and vice versa.
There are some factors that concern me about the beef import bill. One is the — I understand to be a severe lim- itation on the President's right to make decisions in case of emergency. But I'll have to assess the bill in its entirety. If I should make a decision against the legislation, however, because of the feature that I just described to you, then I would work with the Congress to include early next year a countercycli- cal approach. I think it's a very good approach. And I'll just have to make a decison before the end of this week.2
Q. Do you agree with President Sadat's view that the two agreements — the one on the West Bank and the agreement now being negotiated for peace between Israel and Egypt — have to be linked in some way?
A. There's never been any doubt in my mind, nor President Sadat's, nor Prime Minister Begin 's, that one of the premises for the Camp David negotia- tions was a comprehensive peace set- tlement that includes not just an iso- lated peace treaty between Israel and Egypt but includes a continuation of a solution for the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and ultimately for the Golan Heights as well. There is some difference of opinion between the two leaders about how specifically it should be expressed in the Sinai treaty.
I personally favor the presently negotiated language, which in the preamble does say that both nations commit themselves to carry out the comprehensive peace agreement as was agreed at Camp David. This is a matter for negotiation between the two lead- ers.
I have heard Prime Minister Begin say in my presence that he did not de- sire a separate peace treaty with Egypt. And. of course, this is also the opinion and strongly felt view of President Sadat.
We've been negotiating on the Mideast peace agreement for months. I have personally put hundreds of hours into it. We have reached, on more than one occasion so far, agreement on the text between the negotiators them- selves. When they refer the text back to the leaders at home in Egypt and Israel, sometimes the work that has been done is partially undone. But I think that the present language as approved by the negotiators is adequate, and our pre- sumption is to adhere to that language as our preference. But I would like to point out that we are not trying to im- pose our will on the leaders themselves or on those nations, and we hope that they will rapidly reach a conclusion.
There's no doubt in my mind that this kind of difference in language and how a linkage is actually expressed is a matter for negotiation. It does not vio- late the commitments made at Camp David, no matter what the decision might be as reached jointly by Egypt and Israel.
Q. You're being confronted with a growing number of pleas to help bring about a mediated peace in the Latin American country of Nicaragua. Is the United States going to act to prevent further bloodshed and repression, or do you feel that your hands are tied because you don't want to interfere in the inter- nal affairs of another country? What can you do?
A. We are participating actively and
January 1979
daily in the negotiations to bring about a settlement in Nicaragua. I get daily reports from Mr. Bowdler. He was one of the three major negotiators there. We're working in harmony with two other Latin American countries in this effort.3
We are trying to bring about a res- olution of the Nicaraguan question. And I think you know in the last few weeks since these negotiations began, the bloodshed has certainly been dras- tically reduced. It's one of the most difficult tasks that we've undertaken.
And we proposed others to be the negotiators at first. We were unable to find an acceptable group. With our ab- sence, both sides — I guess all sides, there are many more than two — wanted the United States to be negotiators. So, we are negotiating actively now to reach an agreement in Nicaragua to control bloodshed, to minimize dis- putes, and to set up a government there that will have the full support of the Nicaraguan people.
NOV. 304
Q. Do you plan to stay with your pledge to increase your defense budget by 3% despite your anti- inflation drive? And also on defense, there are published reports that you're going to change your nuclear strategy to focus more on massive retaliation. Is that true?
A. Let me answer the last part first. Our nuclear policy basically is one of deterrence; to take actions that are well known by the American people and well known by the Soviets and other nations; that any attack on us would re- sult in devastating destruction by the nation which launched an attack against us. So, the basic policy is one of de- terrence.
We, obviously, constantly assess the quality of our own nuclear weapon systems as times change, as techno- logical advances are made, and as the change takes place in the Soviet Union's arsenal. We keep our weapons up to date; we improve our communi- cations and command and information systems. But we will maintain basically a deterrent policy rather than to change the basic policy itself.
The other answer to your question is that our goal and that of other NATO nations is to increase the real level of defense expenditures. This is our goal. Each expenditure on defense, each system for which we spend the tax-
payer's money will be much more carefully assessed this year to make sure that we are efficient and effective in the funds that we do expend.
Over the last number of years, in- cluding since I've been in office even, the percentage of our total budget and our gross national product that goes into defense has been decreasing. And at the conclusion of the budget cycle, when I make the budget public to the Congress and to the people in about 6 weeks, I know that I'll be responsible to make sure that the social and other domestic needs of our nation are met, our international obligations are ful- filled, and an adequate defense is as- sured, and that there be a proper bal- ance among these different, sometimes conflicting, demands.
So, I'll be responsible, and I will as- sure you and other Americans that when the budget is assessed that I will carry out my responsibilities well.
Q. I'd like to ask you about China. What is your timetable for reaching full normalization of relations with China, and have the recent events that are now going on in China — have those altered that policy? And do you envision China as a potential military ally at any time against the Soviet Union?
A. We don't have any intention of selling any weapons to either China or the Soviet Union. We are improving our relationships with the People's Re- public of China as time goes on, even short of complete diplomatic normali- zation. Our goal, however, is to move toward normalization in accordance with the Shanghai communique agree- ments. The attitude of China, the domestic situation in China, has changed, and we watch it with great interest.
Q. Is it correct that you have de- cided to go ahead with the M-X mobile missile and the Trident II in the next budget? And will you com- ment on the suggestion that that de- cision, if you take it, the decision on civil defense, is actually a part of a plan to sort of pull the fangs of the anti-SALT [Strategic Arms Limita- tion Talks] people, that it's part of a SALT dance, rather than an inde- pendent action?
A. I don't think it's part of a SALT dance. I have not decided yet on what types of new weapons systems, if any, we will advocate in the 1980 fiscal year budget for our strategic arms arsenal.
The press reports about a $2-billion civil defense program have been com-
pletely erroneous, and I have never been able to find where the origin of that story might have derived. No pro- posal has even been made to me for a civil defense program of that mag- nitude.
We are considering the advisability of pursuing some civil defense assess- ments, including the fairly long-term evacuation of some of our major cities if we should think a nuclear war would be likely, which is obviously not a very likely project in itself, a proposal in it- self.
But I have not yet decided when to move on the M-X or if to move on the M-X, what to do about making sure that our present silo missiles are se- cure. The Soviet missiles, as have ours in recent years, have been improved in their quality, particularly in their ac- curacy. And this makes the one leg of our so-called triad more vulnerable, that is, the fixed silo missiles.
We are addressing this question with a series of analyses, but I've not yet made a decision on how to do it
Q. Do you see the events in China as an outcome of your human rights policy?
A. I could make a career out of re- sponding to all the criticisms [laughter] that are made and comments made by other political figures, even including ex-Presidents. I don't intend to do so.
I personally think the human rights policy of our government is well ad- vised and has had broad-ranging, ben- eficial effect. I don't claim credit for the American human rights policy when political prisoners are released from certain countries or when those countries move toward more democratic means, or even when — as is in the case of China now — there are public and apparently permitted de- mands or requests for more democratic government policies and enhanced human rights.
But I think our policy is right. It's well founded. It's one that I will maintain tenaciously, and I think it's demonstrated around the world that it's already had good effect.
Q. Where do we stand on a Middle East accord between Egypt and Is- rael, and what can you or are you doing to try to bring the two parties together?
A. We are negotiating and com- municating with both the leaders of Is- rael and Egypt on a constant and sus- tained basis. I have been dissatisfied
10
and disappointed at the length of time required to bring about a peace treaty that was signed by both Israel and Egypt. I've already outlined in the past my assessment of why this delay has taken place, as contrasted with Camp David. I'm not dealing directly with the principals simultaneously, and a lot of the negotiation has, unfortunately, been conducted through the press be- cause of political reasons, domestically speaking or other reasons.
Although I'm somewhat discour- aged, we are certainly not going to give up on the effort. Tomorrow, I will be meeting with the Prime Minister of Egypt, Mr. Khalil, who's coming, I understand, with a personal message to me from President Sadat.
We have a need, obviously, to get a treaty text pinned down and approved by both governments, and to resolve the very difficult question of the so- called linkage, whether or not certain acts in the West Bank, Gaza Strip have to be taking place at the same time the Sinai agreement is consummated.
But regardless of temporary disap- pointments and setbacks that we've ex- perienced since Camp David, they are no more serious nor of any greater con- cern than some that I experienced at Camp David. And we will continue to pursue our efforts to bring about a peace treaty there.
My reason for what optimism I keep is that I know for certain that both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin want a peace treaty. I know that their people want a peace treaty. And I think as long as this determination on their part is extant, that our own good offices are very likely to be fruitful. So, I will continue the effort, no matter how difficult it might be in the future.
Q. I'd like to ask you about the MIG's in Cuba. Have you come to a decision yet on whether the MIG- 23's in Cuba represent any increased threat to the United States? Have you asked the Russians to take them out? And do you believe the 1962 under- standings with the Soviet Union have been violated?
A. There have been MIG-23's in Cuba for a long time. There is a model of the MIG-23 that's been introduced there late last spring which we have been observing since that time.
We would consider it to be a very serious development if the Soviet Union violated the 1962 agreement. When we have interrogated the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, they have assured us that no shipments of weapons to the Cubans have or will
violate the terms of the 1962 agree- ment. We will monitor their com- pliance with this agreement very care- fully, which we have been doing in the past, both as to the quality of weapons sent there and the quantity of weapons sent there, to be sure that there is no offensive threat to the United States possible from Cuba.
I might add that we have no evidence at all, no allegation that atomic weapons are present in Cuba.
Q. Is there any reason that you feel that the Shah is justifiably in trouble with his people?
A. I think the Shah understands the situation in Iran very clearly and the reasons for some of the problems that he has experienced recently. He has moved forcefully and aggressively in changing some of the ancient religious customs of Iran, for instance, and some of the more conservative or traditional religious leaders deplore this change substantially. Others of the Iranian citi- zens who are in the middle class, who have a new prosperity brought about by enhanced oil prices and extra income coming into the country, I think feel that they ought to have a greater share of the voice in determining the affairs of Iran. Others believe that the de- mocratization of Iran ought to proceed more quickly.
The Shah, as you know, has offered the opposition groups a place in a coa- lition government. They have rejected that offer and demand more complete removal from the Shah of his authority.
We trust the Shah to maintain stabil- ity in Iran, to continue with the de- mocratization process, and also to con- tinue with the progressive change in the Iranian social and economic structure. But I don't think either I or any other national leader could ever claim that we have never made a mistake or have never misunderstood the attitudes of our people. We have confidence in the Shah, we support him and his efforts to change Iran in a constructive way, moving toward democracy and social progress. And we have confidence in the Iranian people to make the ultimate judgments about their own govern- ment.
We do not have any intention of in- terfering in the internal affairs of Iran, and we do not approve any other nation interfering in the internal affairs of Iran.
Q. When you came to office, there was a lot of criticism of the intelli- gence agencies about the methods they were using, and now since the Iran thing there's a good deal of
Department of State Bulletin i
criticism, it seems, about their evaluation.
How concerned were you about the intelligence evaluations in Iran? And could you give us a general comment about what you think the state of the intelligence arts is today?
A. I've said several times that one of the pleasant surprises of my own Ad- ministration has been the high quality of work done by the intelligence com- munity. When I interrogate them about a specific intelligence item or when I get general assessments of intelligence matters, I've been very pleased with the quality of their work.
Recently, however, I have been con- cerned that the trend that was estab- lished about 15 years ago to get intelli- gence from electronic means might have been overemphasized, sometimes to the detriment of the assessment of the intelligence derived and also the intelligence derived through normal political channels, not secret intelli- gence; sometimes just the assessment of public information that's known in different countries around the world. And recently I wrote a note — which is my custom; I write several every day — to the National Security Council, the State Department, and the CIA leaders, and asked them to get together with others and see how we could im- prove the quality of our assessment program and also, particularly, politi- cal assessments.
Since I've been in office, we have substantially modified the order of priorities addressed by the intelligence community in its totality. When I be- came President, I was concerned, dur- ing the first few months, that quite often the intelligence community itself set its own priorities. As a supplier of intelligence information, I felt that the customers, the ones who receive the intelligence information, including the Defense Department, myself, and others, ought to be the ones to say, "This is what we consider to be most important." That effort has been com- pleted, and it's now working very well.
So, to summarize, there is still some progress to be made. I was pleased with the intelligence community's work when I first came into office, and it's been improved since I became Presi- dent.
DEC. 125
Q. Can you confirm reports that a tentative agreement has been reached on SALT with the Soviets, that you may meet at the summit with Brezhnev in January, and also, if
January 1979
11
these are true, can you say what caused the breakthrough?
A. We've made good progress on SALT. I can't say that we've reached agreement. A statement will be made later on today by the State Department and by the Soviets simultaneously about a possible meeting of the Foreign Ministers.6
I think that there has been steady progress made in the last almost 2 years. I can't recall any time when there was a retrogression or a pause in the commitment to reach a SALT agreement. Our position has been clear. We have harmony, I believe, among the Defense Department, State Department and the White House on what should be the U.S. position. If the Soviets are adequately forthcoming, we will have an agreement without further delay. If they are not forthcoming, then we'll continue to negotiate.
Q. And how about the summit?
A. I think that as we approach the time when we are sure that the items have been resolved that are still under negotiation, at that time we will have a summit meeting and at that summit meeting we will discuss not only con- cluding the SALT agreement officially but also having a broad agenda of other items that are of mutual interest to us and the Soviet Union.
Q. The other day you took a very serious view of Israel and Egypt going past the 17th of this month without concluding a treaty, that's the date they themselves set for it. Now with 5 days left, what's your be- lief, or hunch, as to whether they'll meet that deadline; and do you still think it's sort of a "now or never" proposition?
A. I don't think it's now or never. And you very accurately described this deadline date as one established by Is- rael and Egypt in the most solemn commitment at Camp David.
Secretary Vance reports to me from Cairo good progress having been made between him and President Sadat. He has not begun further negotiations with the Israelis yet because of Mrs. Meir's funeral. He will return to Egypt, try to conclude his discussions with President Sadat, and then go back to Israel for discussions with the Israelis [see p. 39].
I consider the deadline date to be quite important. If the Egyptians and Israelis cannot keep a commitment on a 3-month conclusion of a peace treaty when they themselves are the only two nations involved, serving as a mediator in the process, then I think it would be
very difficult for them to expect the terms of the treaty they are negotiating to be carried out with assurance. It sets a very bad precedent for Israel and Egypt not to reach a conclusion.
I think the differences that presently divide Israel and Egypt are minor, cer- tainly compared to the resolution of major differences in the past. And I believe that President Sadat has recon- firmed his intention, his commitment, to Secretary Vance to conclude the negotiations without further delay. My hope is, and my expectation is, that the Israelis will have the same attitude.
Q. At year's end, how do you as- sess the last 11, ll1.- 2 months, the pluses and the minuses as you see them, the hits and the errors, and, particularly, would you speak a little bit about the errors?
A. As a completely nonbiased analyst, I would say that the pluses far outweigh the minuses .... In interna- tional affairs, our country has injected itself. I think wisely, into regional dis- putes where we have no control over the outcome. But we've added our good services, in some instances with almost no immediate prospect of suc- cess. My own reputation has been at stake and that of our country.
In Nicaragua, I think instead of having violent and massive bloodshed we now have the parties negotiating directly with one another for the first time on the terms of a plebescite and whether or not there should be general amnesty. In Namibia we are making some good progress, I believe. The South Africans have now accepted the terms set up by the Secretary General of the United Nations. We are waiting for SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization] to respond. [In fact, SWAPO accepts the relevant U.N. resolutions on Namibia. The President's intention was to call for their continued support. The United States is waiting for South Africa to in- dicate in definitive terms its acceptance of the proposal and a date for the ar- rival of the U.N. transition assistance group.] Cyprus, very minimal but steadily increasing prospects. Mideast, you're well acquainted with that.
And I think that on SALT and other major international items we have made steady progress. So in balance, I'm pleased with the last 1 1 months and don't underestimate the difficulties still facing us.
Q. We seem to be headed for a record trade deficit this year, at a
time when a major new market for U.S. exports is opening in Com- munist China.
A. Yes.
Q. Now there are a number of re- strictions in U.S. trade laws which inhibit our trading with Communist countries, some aspects of the Export-Import Bank Act, the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. My question is, do you intend to try to change and re- move some of those restrictions next year?
A. We are constantly assessing the advisability of maintaining administra- tive restraints.
Of course, we have to put trade in a proper perspective. We can't assess trade itself completely separated from our overall relationships with Com- munist countries, particularly those who are potential adversaries of ours, like the Soviet Union. We want to have increased trade with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China. 1 think the statistics will show that recently we have had increasing trade with both those countries com- pared to last year or several years ago.
If we, in the future, have normal re- lationships with China, diplomatic re- lationships, this would open up in- creased opportunities for trade with those people. In this present time, short of diplomatic relations, we still have major trade missions going to China, Chinese trade missions coming to our country. And I think that this is bearing good results.
We have one more point, and that is security restraints. If there is a sale of high technology items to the Soviet Union, or the People's Republic of China proposed, then not only do the Commerce Department and the State Department and the National Security Council assess this, but I refer it to the Defense Department as well, to be sure that we are not deliberately, or inad- vertently, giving to those countries a means by which their military capabilities would be greatly escalated. This would be contrary to the existing law. But within the bounds of those re- straints, we are attempting to improve our relationships with the People's Re- public of China and with the Soviet Union. And in the process, as part of a stream of increased interrelationships, improved relationships, enhanced trade.
Q. You said last week that if Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat had been able to negotiate together on some of these questions over the past few weeks, that there would not
12
Department of State Bulletin
THE SECRETARY: The U.S. -European
Partnership
Secretary Vance visited London De- cember 8-10, J978, and then pro- ceeded to the Middle East December 10-15 (see p. 39). Following is an ad- dress before the Royal Institute of In- ternational Affairs in London on De- cember 9, 1978.'
More than three decades ago the United States and the nations of West- ern Europe joined together to rebuild a devastated continent and to create a military alliance to protect freedom.
On both sides of the Atlantic, those who fashioned the Marshall Plan and worked to create NATO possessed a vi- sion of a strong America and a strong Europe bound by common interests. From this vision, they created a self- renewing partnership that derives con-
tinuing vitality from the values and hopes that we share.
We have passed through a particu- larly difficult period during the 1970's. But we have navigated these turbulent waters. Although the course ahead re- mains demanding, the progress we have made should give us great confi- dence in our future.
• For the first time in its history, all members of the NATO alliance are democracies.
• NATO is strong and growing stronger.
• We have not only resisted the worst protectionist pressures in a gen- eration; we are working together to shape a healthier and more open world trading system.
• We have established a pattern of closer consultation on economic and se- curity matters than at any point in re- cent history.
• European integration is proceed- ing, confirming our belief that a strong Europe is good for a strong America.
• And we are moving toward more normal relations with the nations of Eastern Europe. Progress toward this goal has reflected our support for full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the nations of this area.
Today, I want to discuss with you how, building on this solid foundation, we can continue to assure our mutual security and foster a healthy resurgence
News Conferences (Cont'd)
have been some of the problems that have arisen. My question is, if all else fails, would you consider calling the two leaders back to Camp David or some other place to negotiate di- rectly with you to resolve this mat- ter?
A. Let me say that I don't have any present plans to do that. If all else failed — and I felt that we could get to- gether again — I would not hesitate to do so. But I don't envision that taking place.
Q. What will be the domestic and international effect if the Shah fails to maintain power in Iran?
A. I fully expect the Shah to main- tain power in Iran and for the present problems in Iran to be resolved, al- though there have been certainly de- plorable instances of bloodshed which we would certainly want to avoid, or see avoided. I think the predictions of doom and disaster that came from some sources have certainly not been realized at all. The Shah has our sup- port and he also has our confidence.
We have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran and we have no intention of permitting others to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. The difficult situation there has been exacerbated by uncontrolled statements made from foreign nations that encourage blood baths and vio-
lence. This is something that really is deplorable and I would hope would cease after this holy season passes.
I think it's good to point out that the Iranian people for 2,500 years, perhaps as long as almost any nation on earth, have had the ability for stable self- government. There have been changes in the government, yes, sometimes violence, but they have a history of an ability to govern themselves, and be- cause of that and other factors which I've just described, I think the situation in Iran will be resolved successfully.
Q. To what extent are you con- cerned over the prospect of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations raising the price of oil this weekend — reports are it will be in the neighborhood of 5% — the impact this would have on inflation, and do you contemplate any future actions to curb oil im- ports?
A. Most of our problems with the adverse trade balances can be attributed to oil imports, although we have other problems as well. I certainly hope that the OPEC nations will decide not to raise the price of oil. If they do, I hope it would be minimal.
We have tried to convince them that this is in the best interests of the world economy, and also in the best interests of the OPEC nations themselves, to have a stable world economy with a minimum of inflation jn the future. We're trying to set a good example in our own nation, both in controlling in-
flation and also in stabilizing the value of the dollar on which the price of oil is based.
The countries in the OPEC nations have suffered somewhat because for a time the dollar value was going down very rapidly. It has recovered since the first of November. So I would hope, first of all, to repeat myself, that there will be no increase in the price of oil. If they must increase the price of oil, I think it ought to be minimal for their own benefit and for the benefit of the world.
□
'Held at the Muehlebach Hotel; for full text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- ments of Nov. 13, 1978, p. 1986.
2On Nov. 10. the President signed a memo- randum of disapproval of the Meat Import Act of 1978 (H.R. 11545); for text of that memoran- dum, see Weekly Compilation of Nov. 20, p. 2009.
'Ambassador William G. Bowdler, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, is the U.S. representative on the international mediation team for Nicaragua. The other two representatives are from Guatemala and the Dominican Republic.
4For full text, see Weekly Compilation of Dec. 4, 1978, p. 2096.
sFor full text, see Weekly Compilation of Dec. 18, 1978, p. 2219.
6On Dec. 12. 1978, Department spokesman Hodding Carter III annnounced that Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet in Geneva Dec. 21-22, 1978, to con- tinue discussions on SALT.
January 1979
of our economies. These are the most pressing items on our common agenda. But even as we concentrate on these vital concerns, which have been the constant threads of our partnership, our common interests compel us to address together a broadened international agenda. For there are longer term challenges to our security and well- being that also demand serious and sustained attention.
• How will the international eco- nomic system, as well as our own economies, adapt to changing patterns of international trade and commerce?
• How can we meet increasing energy needs without heightening the risk of nuclear proliferation?
• How can we help meet the legiti mate security needs of nations while seeking agreed limitations on the growth of conventional arms sales?
• And how can we find the political will to act now on issues which will have a profound impact on the world we leave our children, issues such as population growth and environmental protection?
These issues will tax our creativity and persistence to the fullest. For we approach all of these issues in a changing and pluralistic international system, with over 150 independent na- tions and emerging new power centers. No single nation, or group of nations, can dictate solutions to these complex problems. They are truly international in their origins and in the necessary scope of their solutions. Increasingly, our leadership must therefore take the form of inspiring other nations to work with us toward goals we share and can best achieve in concert. And on each of these issues, we look to our European allies as a core around which we must build these cooperative efforts.
Our ability to address this broader agenda will depend on the essential vi- tality of our partnership — and specif- ically on our economic and military strength.
Economic Security for Our Peoples
For most of our countries, the most pressing demand today is to revitalize our economies and to restore a sense of confidence in our economic system.
When the economic history of the last 5 years is written, two important trends will stand out. The United States and Europe, and indeed the indus- trialized democracies as a whole, have experienced the most severe economic problems of the last quarter century. These included sharp increases in world oil prices and inflation followed
13
by a serious recession and high un- employment.
Yet despite these serious problems, we have been successful in strengthening our economic and politi- cal cooperation. Instead of sliding back into the beggar-thy-neighbor psychol- ogy that destroyed the global economy in the 1930's, we have created new and more effective mechanisms for serious, concerted actions. The institution of periodic summit meetings on economic matters, closer collaboration among monetary authorities, the creation of the International Energy Agency and a more active Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) — all these efforts reflect con- fidence in our capacities not despair in the face of difficulties.
The U.S. Economy
The United States fully recognizes the importance of a strong and vital American economy to building greater economic security for Europe, Japan and other nations of the world. What we do in Washington can affect the lives of citizens of London or Rome, just as the decisions of other govern- ments affect the well-being of Ameri- cans.
Accordingly, the domestic economic policies of the United States are fashioned with a view toward the eco- nomic interests of the Atlantic commu- nity as a whole. Fundamental to this effort are the commitments made by President Carter at the Bonn summit last July. He pledged the United States
We are increasing our economic coordination with one another for a simple reason: Because we all now understand that the economic health of each of us is important to the economic health of us all.
We are increasing our economic coordination with one another for a simple reason: Because we all now un- derstand that the economic health of each of us is important to the economic health of us all. This is especially true in times of economic difficulty. Pres- sures increase to protect domestic mar- kets, competition sharpens, and we are all tempted to resolve our individual problems at the expense of our neighbors. But it is precisely then that we must be particularly sensitive to the impact our decisions at home will have on others abroad. If we make those de- cisions without sufficient regard for the problems of others, we only invite re- taliation and a spiral of compensating actions. All of us will lose ground; all of us will be worse off.
As a result, we all have clearly rec- ognized that only through the develop- ment of a common strategy, to which each country contributes, can we en- hance the well-being of every nation.
Cooperating in this way can be dif- ficult and frustrating. Domestic politi- cal support for tough economic deci- sions often comes slowly in democra- cies. In some cases, results fall short of our expectations and we must redouble our efforts. But actions by each of us, together with greater transatlantic cooperation, have placed the United States and the other industrialized nations on the path to sustained, noninflationary growth. Success will enhance our ability to expand indi- vidual opportunity and social justice, which are the greatest strengths of our democracies.
to a major effort to reduce inflation and to an energy policy which significantly reduces U.S. oil imports.
We are taking specific actions to fulfill these commitments. On October 24, President Carter announced a broad-based program to fight inflation. It includes monetary restraint, sharp reductions in governmental spending, and explicit standards for wage and price increases. The President's new budget will put a very tight lid on pub- lic expenditures and reduce our federal deficit to less than half that of 1976.
The President has stressed that con- trolling inflation is our overriding domestic priority. We will persist until we have achieved that objective. On November 1 , we undertook further far-reaching actions to reinforce the anti-inflation effort and strengthen the dollar. We have tightened monetary conditions significantly. The United States also joined with the three major surplus countries — Germany, Japan, and Switzerland — in coordinating di- rect intervention in the foreign ex- change market to correct the excessive decline of the dollar. We will continue to cooperate in a forceful and coordi- nated way to assure stability in ex- change markets. To finance its share, the United States is mobilizing an un- precedented $30 billion which will be used, together with resources of the other countries, to intervene massively if necessary to achieve our objectives. The United States has also expanded its gold sales program.
We expect that with the fundamental improvements in the U.S. economic
14
Department of State Bulletin i
position now underway, these actions will exert a continuing positive effect on the dollar. On November 9, the President signed legislation which lays the basis for a sounder U.S. energy policy. This legislation should result in oil import savings of roughly 2.5 mil- lion barrels per day by 1985. We are already improving our energy situation. U.S. energy prices have risen signifi- cantly closer to world levels. And growth in energy consumption is now running well below growth in our GNP. We are also working to reduce our balance-of-payments deficit through a more vigorous export promotion pro- gram.
President Carter is determined to build political support for serious ac- tions to deal with our economic prob- lems. That support is growing. Neither the President, Congress, nor the American people will be satisfied until we show marked progress in fighting inflation, strengthening the dollar, and creating a sound energy economy.
U.S. -European Economic Cooperation
While the first task for each of us is to put our domestic house in order, we must at the same time undertake those joint efforts that are needed to sustain our economic growth. There is no more immediate or more crucial test of our ability to join together for our common gain than the successful completion, this month, of the multilateral trade negotiations.
the political cooperation that we have painstakingly achieved.
A major objective of the trade negotiations is to provide for an agreed framework to govern subsidies and countervailing duties. When our Con- gress convenes next month, the Presi- dent will seek legislation to extend the authority to waive countervailing duties to cover the period needed to imple- ment the Tokyo Round agreements. And we will take measures to minimize the disruptive effects that could flow from expiration of the waivers on January 3.
Our negotiators in Geneva will strive to conclude their talks this month. But even as we gain ground toward a more open and better operating trading sys- tem, we must avoid piecemeal retreats toward protectionism which could undermine that progress. In each coun- try, various groups will continue to ask governments to intervene in the trading system for economic, political, and so- cial reasons. Our countries have recog- nized the importance of resisting demands which impede effective economic adjustment to change. Our re- sponse to such demands must be within the context of the trading framework we have designed together. Our policies must facilitate positive adjust- ment of our economies to changing economic conditions, rather than hin- dering such adjustment or shifting the burden onto others.
Beyond the immediate need to strengthen the world trading system, we all have a basic interest in promot-
. . . the central fact of world security has been strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. We and our partners have managed this situation without allowing either our deterrent or our will to be eroded.
During the last three decades, we have worked together to build a more open and better functioning world trading system. Now we have an op- portunity to consolidate the progress we have made and further improve the structure of our trading relationships. In so doing, we can construct for the future a trading environment with greater certainty and confidence — one which will foster the continued expan- sion of world commerce. If we suc- ceed, there will be economic gains for us all. If we fail, we will jeopardize the economic progress we have made. Failure would fuel our inflation, slow our growth, and make it more difficult for developing nations to play a full part in the world trading system. And if we fail, we will have also jeopardized
ing the emerging role of the European Community in international economic affairs. In the United States, we admire the vision of men and women who are working to broaden and deepen cooper- ation among the nations of Europe. We welcome and support this development, for a strong European Community is in America's interest as well as in the interests of all European nations; it provides a dynamic new force in inter- national economic and political rela- tions.
The new European monetary ar- rangements for closer monetary cooperation within the European Community, announced on December 5, represent an important step toward the economic integration of Europe we have long supported. We believe that the
new arrangements will be implemented | in a way which will contribute to sus- tainable growth in the world economy and a stable international monetary system. The United States looks for- ward to continued close consultations with its European trading partners as these arrangements evolve.
In general, the next few years will be critical ones for Europe, as the Com- munity works toward closer economic integration, expands its membership, holds its first direct elections to the European parliament, and assumes a growing responsibility for the political and economic well-being of Europe as a whole.
All the Western democracies share in support and concern for the democra- cies in southern Europe. We in the United States respect the political commitment of Community leaders to open its membership to these states and to deal with the economic problems that will come with such a step.
As prospering Western democracies, we should recognize a special respon- sibility to those democracies in the re- gion threatened by a faltering economy — where the short-term pros- pects are bleak but where, with a helping hand, economies can be put on a sound footing and the long-term prospects can be bright. There are es- tablished mechanisms to provide needed assistance — the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Some situations may also call for com- plementary informal or ad hoc ar- rangements. The consortium for Por- tugal is an example. Those nations in a position to help should concert their energies and resources. Supportive ac- tion before it is too late is an invest- ment in the future of freedom.
Relations With the Developing World
As we consider means to strengthen the economic bonds among the de- veloped countries, we must recognize that our interests — and our respon- sibilities— do not end there. Meeting the desire of our citizens for economic security and a rising standard of living requires us to respond more fully to the aspirations of peoples in developing na- tions. Increasingly, their economic well-being is indispensable to our own.
Together, the world's developing countries account for roughly one-third of total trade for the OECD nations. These countries provide the most rapidly expanding markets for exports of the industrial world — markets on which millions of jobs in our nations depend. Developing countries provide us with critical raw materials. And we need their cooperation to solve such
luary 1979
15
critical global problems as energy and food.
In short, we cannot build a strong international economic system without steady economic progress by the de- veloping nations. Together, we must attempt to push aside the ideological debates which often have characterized the relationship between the developing and industrial nations. We must seek practical and concrete measures to ad- dress the basic needs of roughly 800 million people who live in absolute poverty.
There is no more important challenge to the world's long-term well-being, to our political security, and to our essen- tial values as free peoples than working together with the developing nations to foster their economic progress.
Security Issues
The cornerstone of our prosperity is the confidence we have in our security. This security depends essentially on maintaining strong military forces; on managing effectively the West's rela- tions with the Soviet Union; on seeking to limit and reduce arms in both East and West; and on the strength of the Atlantic partnership.
We can find cause for concern in the continuing increases in Soviet military programs and deployments. But we can also find cause for confidence in the steps we in the alliance are taking to preserve the military balance.
For some years now, the central fact of world security has been strategic nu- clear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. We and our partners have managed this situation without allowing either our deterrent or our will to be eroded.
The fact of strategic parity remains. Just as we will match Soviet increases, so we must assume that the Soviets are resolved to match us. Thus, the pursuit of superiority by either side would re- sult in frustration, waste, increased tension, and in the end reduced security for all.
Our common security rests on three underlying principles.
First, just as we must remain alert and resolute about Soviet actions, so we must also be ready to explore and expand areas of mutual interest. To allow our fears to obscure our need to seek common ground is to condemn ourselves to unrelenting tension. But neither can we let our desire for better relations lead us into arrangements that will not adequately protect our national interests.
Second, we must be prepared to do what is necessary to assure our secu-
rity, while preferring to maintain a bal- ance at lower levels of armaments. Both the military and arms control paths have figured centrally in the his- tory of NATO's pursuit of security.
Arms control is complicated and frustrating. Our goals and our efforts will inevitably be criticized by some who believe there is too little disarma- ment and by others who believe the
Allied interests have been pro- tected [in SALT] because allied interests are our interests.
Soviets are taking advantage of arms control agreements. Let us be clear and realistic about what we are seeking to accomplish. Arms control cannot put an end to military competition. But we can, and do, use arms control to cap arms buildups, to begin the difficult process of reductions and qualitative restraints, and to sustain a needed dialogue.
Arms control, correctly understood and wisely applied, is yet another way — a complementary way — to pur- sue security. We should not let our in- ability to accomplish everything im- mediately discourage us from signifi- cant steps we can achieve.
Third, while the United States will remain unsurpassed in military strength, we all must remain constantly aware that our security requires collec- tive allied effort, and that our defense is indivisible. As an alliance, we share in decisions on security questions, just as we share in the burdens and risks of a common defense. Western strength — in a military sense and also in a larger sense — depends upon the health of our partnership and in our self-confidence about the future.
These fundamental principles guide our security decisions. A look at the actual military situation and trends and at how the United States and its allies manage the condition of strategic par- ity, shows that we face great challenges and we are meeting them through co- operative action.
U.S. strategic modernization plans span the land, sea, and air components of our forces. We are developing a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and options for new ICBM basing are under intensive review to allow us to choose the best among the various alternatives. We will begin de- ploying a new submarine-based missile next year, and we are building a new strategic submarine. We have a vigor- ous long-range cruise missile program
underway, including not only the air launched version but sea- and ground-launched versions as well. These programs will insure that the al- liance's strength will continue to be sufficient to deter attack and protect our common interests.
SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] is another instrument for bolstering security. SALT I and the ABM treaty [Treaty on Limiting Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems] began the important process of limiting strategic arms. Without these agreements, we would have been launched into a defen- sive arms race on top of an unlimited race in offensive arms.
SALT II will be a major brake on the momentum of strategic arms competi- tion. Facing a more regulated and pre- dictable future, we will be able to de- vote more of our attention, talent, and resources to improving conventional and theater nuclear forces for NATO. SALT II will establish the principle of equality in the number of strategic de- livery vehicles. And it will put a limit on the number of MIRV'd [multiple independently-targetable reentry ve- hicle] ICBM's, which are potentially most harmful to stability.
At the same time, SALT II will not rule out the force programs we have underway to meet the challenges that will remain even with an agreement. We have preserved all our major strategic force options. Other programs that can strengthen deterrence in NATO can go forward. Allied interests have been protected because allied interests are our interests.
Let me emphasize that in both our defense efforts and our arms control negotiations, our basic aim is to strengthen the security of the United States and that of our allies. This has been and will always be the funda- mental touchstone of our policy.
That is why we are involved in SALT — because a sound agreement will improve Western and global secu- rity. Without an agreement our tech- nological and economic strength would enable us to match any Soviet strategic buildup. But a good agreement can provide more security with lower risk and cost. And we recognize that with- out SALT the strategic competition could infect the entire East-West politi- cal relationship, damaging the effort to create a less dangerous world which is at the heart of Western foreign policies.
The emerging SALT II agreement will not solve all our problems. It will not, for example, reverse the trend to- ward increased vulnerability of fixed, land-based missiles, a problem in the long run for both sides. Necessary
16
strategic force modernization must and will move forward, just as the SALT process must and will move forward. In SALT III we will work for further re- ductions and qualitative limits.
We cannot discuss the management of strategic parity without coming to grips with the issue of how NATO should respond to Soviet improvements in their nuclear forces targeted against Europe. Though the linkage to Ameri- can strategic forces remain NATO's ultimate deterrent, the Soviets must understand that we will not let a weak- ness develop at any point along the continuum of our deterrent, including theater nuclear forces. We have several theater nuclear modernization programs in process. We are exploring whether arms control efforts could be of bene- fit. Although no decisions have been reached regarding force requirements or arms control, we are consulting in- tensively within the alliance to fashion a common plan.
At the conventional level, improve- ments in Soviet forces continue. Here too the West is responding effectively. The May 1978 summit meeting in Washington agreed to a Long-Term Defense Program designed to improve the ability of NATO to function as a defense coalition. NATO is placing top priority on improving conventional forces. In the last few years, the United Stites has increased its forces in Europe by roughly 10.000. NATO is broadly engaged in a determined effort to increase readiness and capabilities for sustained defense. Wisely, we are emphasizing improvements which draw upon our collective technological strengths, and which will result in greater effectiveness rather than simply larger forces. Many of these steps are not glamorous; they do not attract headlines. But they are serious steps taken by a serious alliance, resolved to muster the resources and will to build a better common defense.
Here, too, we are striving to negotiate restraints based on parity — 1978 has brought movement by both sides in the 5-year-old MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] negoti- ations. Difficult problems remain. But gaining Soviet agreement to reduce forces to equal collective levels is worth a further sustained effort. Let us hope that the achievement of a strategic arms limitations agreement can impart a new momentum to the MBFR negotiations.
Of course, Western security con- cerns and interests are wider than NATO. We must also ask whether, in an age of strategic parity, we are at a disadvantage in competing with the Soviet Union in the Third World. The
Department of State Bulletin
Question-and-Answer Session Following London Address
Q. We have heard in some detail the American objective in the world mainly by matching the Soviet arms strength. I would like to know if America is taking positive steps to remove distrust by negotiations with the Soviets on points of difference?
A. The United States, as I believe many of you know, is involved in a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union in many areas. We are involved, as I have indicated, of course, in the negotiations dealing with strategic arms. Those discussions are coming into their final stages right now. and I believe in the accomplishing of a sound
agreement. And we will not sign that agreement unless it is a sound agree- ment. It will be a major step toward achieving a more stable world. We are involved in discussions with Great Britain and the Soviet Union looking to a comprehensive test ban. When those negotiations are concluded — and I be- lieve they will be concluded satisfactorily — I believe this will be another major step along the road to world peace. In cases of the Third World, we discuss these matters with the Soviet Union, trying to urge them to cooperate with us when we can, and making very clear our views so that there can be no misunderstanding of
answer is no. While Soviet capabilities for projecting military power have im- proved, the United States retains not only unequalled naval forces and other forms of military power but also enjoys economic and political advantages.
We also welcome the growing spirit of national independence in the de- veloping nations. They have demon- strated, time and again, their determi- nation and ability to avoid domination by any outside powers.
Since 1960, the decolonization proc- ess, now nearly complete, has pro- duced some 65 new nations, with widely differing political, economic and social systems. During these years, outside influence has waxed and waned in different countries and at different times. There have not been the perma- nent Communist advances many once feared.
This diversity and the irrepressible thirst for national freedom among the Third World nations are the surest barriers to foreign domination. We can best promote our own interests in these areas of the world by welcoming this diversity and respecting this spirit.
The economic, political, cultural, and security ties between the West and the Third World have supported this spirit of independence. We must strengthen those ties by continuing to support the economic development and, when necessary, the military se- curity of these nations through our as- sistance; by pressing the Soviets and their allies to exercise restraint in trou- bled areas: and by working to resolve diplomatically those disputes which offer opportunities for foreign interfer- ence.
In the long run, it is the ability of the West to offer practical support to Third World nationalism, self-determination, and economic growth that should make us very confident about our future relations.
Conclusion
In each of the areas I have addressed today, whether economic, political, or military, one finds extraordinary chal- lenges. But together, America and Europe have extraordinary resources with which to meet them.
The physical, industrial, and tech- nological resources of our alliance are unequaled. If we have the will to de- velop our economies with equity and maintain our defenses with determina- tion, we can achieve a safer and more stable world. And we have that will.
In the end, our alliance is held to- gether not simply by what we are against, but by what we are for. Our greatest strengths are the ties that bind us together. These ties are founded on a vision of the rights and dignity of the individual, on political justice, and freedom for all people. The negotia- tions in which we are engaged, and the policies we pursue, lack meaning un- less our foreign policies are in accord with these basic values of our peoples.
Winston Churchill spoke once of the need to pull together and firmly grasp the larger hopes of humanity. His charge remains, today, our chal- lenge. □
'Introductory paragraph omitted; text from press release 446.
January 1979
our determination, and what we believe in respect to these matters.
There is another wide range of negotiations that we have with the Soviet Union in nonmilitary, non- strategic matters, and it would take a very long time to encompass all of those. But if 1 understand your question correctly, we are engaged across the board in a series of discussions on both political, economic, and military mat- ters with them.
Q. I'd like to ask you about Iran. Can you tell us whether you still be- lieve that the Shah of Iran is the best chance for stability in that country, and whether there are circumstances in which you might be prepared to give him military assistance in his predicament?
A. We have stated very clearly that we support stability in Iran and we support the Shah. We have indicated, however, that we are not going to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. The Shah has indicated that he plans to move toward elections in the latter half of the year 1979. We support that ob- jective; we think that that is a sound objective. We support his program in moving toward democracy and to liberalizing conditions within his country.
Q. Do you see any virtue in the idea of pressuring Ian Smith [Prime Minister of the white regime in Southern Rhodesia] to end unilater- ally declared independence by sur- rendering to British though it is ar- gued the Anglo-American plan could be implemented by fear and hope- fully with the advice and support of the front-line states from the United Nations?
A. The United States and Great Brit- ain, I am sure, as all of you know, have been working closely together on the problems of southern Africa in- cluding the problems of Rhodesia. The current situation in Rhodesia is one which is, to say the least, cloudy and rather gloomy at this moment. The ef- forts which we have made to try and bring the parties together so as to see if we could not reach a peaceful solution based upon a free vote have not borne fruit.
The Prime Minister has sent to southern Africa his personal represen- tative who is reviewing the situation there and upon his return will report and make his recommendations to the Prime Minister. We shall await the re- sults of that trip. We, of course, are keeping very closely in touch with our British colleagues on a daily basis; but I think it would be premature for me to
make any expression until we see the results of that trip.
Q. I would like to press you again on the question about Iran [inaudi- ble] and secondly, what prospects do you see for making any progress in the Middle East during your trip there?
A. As far as Iran is concerned, the matter is in the hands of the Shah and the Government of Iran, and we shall have to see what develops there.
Insofar as the Middle East is con- cerned, the President has asked me to go to the Middle East to meet with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, to see whether we can find a way to overcome the obstacles which are blocking the conclusion of negotia- tions which have now been going on for almost 3 months.1 In less than 2 weeks it will have been the full 3 months that were set forth in the Camp David accords to conclude an agree- ment with respect to the matters under negotiation.
There are basically two matters which are the obstacles at this point. One relates to the question of the timetable for the holding of elections and establishing a self-governing au- thority on the West Bank and in Gaza. The other relates to a provision of the treaty text which deals with the ques- tion of the relationship of that treaty to existing treaties which either nation may have. We believe that it should be possible to find a way through these two problems.
I do not believe that peace should be denied to the people in the Middle East by a failure to resolve these problems. So, we are going to see if we can do anything to help by working with these leaders to overcome these obstacles. I can't make any prediction as to whether this is possible. I can say, without any doubt in my mind, that achieving a resolution — a prompt res- olution of these issues — is clearly in the interest of the Arabs, the interests of the people of Israel, the people of the region, and to the people of the world. We shall do everything within our power to try and help them bring this to a satisfactory conclusion.
Q. Do you intend to shuttle be- tween the two countries? [inaudible]
A. The question was, do I plan to shuttle back and forth between Cairo and Jerusalem, and secondly, do I think that it can be accomplished within the 3 months which expire on December 17. The answer is that I plan to go first to Cairo and then to Jerusalem. If after doing that it appears that a shuttle process would be helpful.
17
I am prepared to do that. As to whether or not I think that there can be a solu- tion by the 17th, that depends on the parties. They are the ones that have to make the decision. They are the ones who will sign the peace treaty. So, the decisions will have to be made by the governments of those two nations.
Q. After Camp David [inaudible] sharp disagreement between Carter and Mr. Begin on the question of settlements. As you said, the 3-month period is now soon over, and Mr. Begin [inaudible] what would be the American reaction if, after signing the peace treaty, Mr. Begin will dis- solve the military administration as the first step in the direction of au- tonomy, but simultaneously set up, let's say, 20 new settlements thereby [inaudible] and depriving the Pales- tinians and the Jordanians from [inaudible]?
A. I don't know if you all heard the question or not. It's a long question, so I am not going to try to restate it. On the question of the establishment of the military government and the dismant- ling of the military government by withdrawing it from the West Bank and Gaza, that is provided for in the gen- eral framework which was signed as a result of the Camp David meetings, and that is a solemn undertaking which, when the agreement is reached, I would expect both parties to carry out. With respect to the question of settlements, we believe that the agreement which was reached on the question of settle- ments is that there would be no new settlements in the West Bank until the conclusion of the negotiations with re- spect to the setting up of the self- governing authority.
The Prime Minister takes a different view. I do not know what the Israeli Government will or will not do, and I don't want to predict the future. But those are the facts and that's the way they stand.
Q. Can I raise one other question which you didn't mention in your speech? There is the question of China, which is a matter of consider- able interest to Europe at this time. We are really, I think, the countries of Europe, trying very hard to con- sider what our attitude to China should be and as you know the British Government is in particular trying to decide whether it ought to sell a lot of very expensive arms, airplanes, and I know the French have just signed an agreement with the Chinese for a very large trade deal. Now what is your advice to us as Europeans in relation to our rela- tions with China?
Department of State Bulletin I
AFRICA: U.S. Policy Toward South Africa
by Anthony Lake
Address before the Conference on U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa in San Francisco on October 31, J978. Mr. Lake is Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
As we consider U.S. policy toward South Africa, it is important that we keep in mind three basic facts.
• The problem of racial polarization in South Africa is serious and is grow- ing.
• Change will come in South Africa. The welfare of the people there, and American interests, will be profoundly
affected by the way in which it comes. The question is whether it will be peaceful or not.
• Our efforts to promote construc- tive and peaceful change have involved both cooperation and strong differences with South Africa. Over the years, the differences have grown as the problems in South Africa have grown.
I would like to discuss each of these briefly.
Increased Racial Polarization
Over the years, a system has been built in South Africa which mandates racial separation and perpetuates in-
Question-and- Answer Session (Cont'd)
A. Let me say I am very hesitant to give advice to another sovereign na- tion. Let me tell you what our policy is and let me state our views with respect to the Chinese situation. Insofar as the question of military sales is concerned, it has been and will continue to be our policy that we will not sell military weapons or equipment to China or to the Soviet Union. Insofar as other na- tions are concerned, that is a decision which they must make for themselves.
Secondly, with respect to the ques- tion of the future, insofar as we are concerned, we stated at the outset of our Administration that one of the goals of this Administration would be to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. That remains one of the main goals of our Administration. As to the timing and the modalities of accomplishing this, this is a matter that is difficult because in doing this we want to make sure that if this is done, the well-being of the people of Taiwan is not jeopardized. So, we will con- tinue to discuss these matters and hopefully come to a conclusion which will permit us to reach our goals and normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. Was there another part of the question I didn't get?
Q. Can you tell us how far the United States will go in its support of Romania?
A. Romania is an independent nation with whom we have excellent relations. Our relations have improved continu- ously over the last several years, and we will continue to strive to improve those relations.
Q. The chairman characterized your speech as being an optimistic one, but isn't the sentence in your speech that there have not been the permanent Communist advances many once feared rather over- optimistic in the light of the Com- munist successes in Angola, in the Horn of Africa, and recently in Af- ghanistan, the situation in Turkey, would that not suggest — not to men- tion the pickings for the Soviet Union should the Shah be toppled in Iran? Would that not suggest some revision of policy in the light of these appar- ent Communist advances?
A. We have, of course, followed each of the events to which you re- ferred with the greatest of care and thought. We are concerned about the situation in a number of the areas which you pointed out, but I think one has to take a look across the broader spectrum. If you take a look and see what the situation is in Africa as com- pared with several years ago, you will find quite a different picture. I think one has to take a look at the long run and to design one's policy with respect to the long future rather than simply reacting to individual situations. That does not mean that in a given situation it may not be necessary to take a spe- cific action. But. I think that when I said what I said there, I was talking across the broad spectrum of the world, and not trying to pick out any particular region. □
Press release 446A of Dec. IU1978.
'For material relating to Secretary Vance's visit to Egypt and Israel, see p. 39.
equality; the problems within South Africa are therefore growing.
• In distribution of the land, 13% is reserved for the 71% of the population who are black; 87% is reserved for the 17% who are white.
• Over 60% of the black population lives in areas reserved for whites. Think for a moment what this means for those people; All of them must carry passes; most would be forced to overcrowded so-called "homelands" if they lost their jobs; their families are often not allowed to live with them.
• The average black income is less than one-eighth of average white earn- ings.
• Education is compulsory and free for white students. It is neither com- pulsory nor free for blacks; and spend- ing per child in white schools is over 15 times that in black schools.
• Basic facilities — housing, elec- tricity, plumbing, health care — are woefully inadequate for blacks, far in- ferior to those for whites.
• South African blacks who live and work in white areas have no say in making the laws which so dominate every area of their lives. They are de- fined by the South African Government as citizens of small and fragmented homelands which they may never have seen; they have no citizenship rights where they live and work and form an essential part of economic life.
The white Afrikaners who dominate the politics of South Africa have their own historic roots and their own fears for the future. Their forebears came to South Africa in the 16th century; they have developed their own language, culture, and religion. If their security were jeopardized in South Africa, they would have nowhere else to go. They, too, are Africans.
Our hope must be that they can be convinced, while there is still time, that racial progress will do more to se- cure their future than to threaten it. There has been, and there may continue to be, some relaxation in the practice of apartheid in South Africa. Some hotels, restaurants, bars, and theaters have been integrated. "Whites Only" bar- riers in some public facilities have been removed. It has been made easier for blacks to own homes in white areas.
We should welcome these changes. But most black South Africans see little sign that fundamental change is being achieved. For generations, most black South African leaders have tried to en- gage white leaders in constructive dialogue on the future of the country; they have sought to reason and per- suade; they have attempted to find a way to work together with whites to-
January 1979
ward greater political and economic equality. Yet many of these leaders have been detained. Their organiza- tions have been banned.
With each failure to achieve prog- ress, blacks have become more doubt- ful about a strategy of dialogue and peaceful demonstrations. Events in re- cent months have added greatly to this bitterness and may have convinced many, particularly of the younger gen- eration, that efforts to achieve peaceful change are futile. The killing of stu- dents during the Soweto uprisings, the deaths in detention of Steven Biko and other young leaders, and finally the bannings and detentions of numerous black leaders and organizations on October 19 of last year have left a deep legacy of bitterness.
Promoting Peaceful Change
Recognizing that our influence is limited, it is deeply in our interest to do what we can to halt this trend to- ward racial polarization and violence and to promote serious, peaceful change.
It is clear that change will come in South Africa. But if significant peace- ful progress does not begin soon, the gap between black and white could be- come irremediable. This would have tragic consequences for the people of South Africa and for the region. If an organic, irreversible crisis developed, we would have fewer and fewer policy choices. And it would have a serious impact on our own national interests.
• Such a crisis could produce strains in our relations with other African na- tions. Our ties — economic and political — to these countries are in- creasingly important.
• A growing racial confrontation in South Africa could have serious domestic repercussions for the United States.
• South Africa has great natural wealth and is an important source of key raw materials. We and the rest of the world have an interest in economic stability in South Africa and in the de- velopment of all her human as well as natural resources.
• Growing racial conflict in South Africa would provide an opportunity for intervention by outside powers and could bring ideological as well as racial polarization.
I think most Americans agree that we should do what we can to promote peaceful change in South Africa, al- though some are more concerned that it be peaceful, others that it be change. The major arguments come with regard to how best we can use our in-
fluence— recognizing its limits — to promote peaceful change. I look for- ward to exploring those arguments with you this morning.
Broadly speaking, there have been, 1 believe, two poles in approaches to this question: on the one hand pressure and isolation; on the other, communication and persuasion.
Over the past three decades, some have argued that through closer ties with South Africa, we can help the whites find a way to liberalize South African society. Our economic ties, they would argue, help provide oppor- tunities for blacks; and higher positions for blacks in the economy, particularly in skilled jobs and management, will eventually lead to political rights. They would also point to the positive exam- ple which American companies can set by following fair employment prac- tices, as in the code developed by the Reverend Leon Sullivan and endorsed by a number of American companies.
A second school rejects this theory.
19
South African Government toward res- olution of all three of the region's criti- cal problems: Rhodesia, Namibia, and apartheid in South Africa itself. There must be progress on all of these issues. We will welcome and recognize South African efforts to achieve progress on any of them.
We will do whatever we can to sup- port meaningful change in South Af- rica; but we recognize that we cannot dictate the precise nature of change. It is for the people of South Africa themselves — all the people — to deter- mine the future of their society. We have urged that leaders in the South African Government soon begin a seri- ous dialogue with representative lead- ers of all the people to explore ways to resolve the country's growing prob- lems.
But if there is not significant prog- ress in South Africa, relations between our two countries will inevitably de- teriorate. This is a fact, not a prefer- ence. Our own values, the fundamental
Change will come in South Africa. The welfare of the people there, and American interests, will be profoundly affected by the way in which it comes. The question is whether it will be peaceful or not.
primarily on the grounds that three decades of economic growth have not produced fundamental change in South Africa; that foreign economic invest- ment has helped strengthen a repressive system; and that the only course which can bring the whites to allow real change is to use economic leverage against them. They would argue that the South African Government must be isolated from the international commu- nity if it persists in a system which all regard as unjust; and that strong, clear opposition by the world community to apartheid will provide encouragement to the majority within South Africa who have been denied their freedom.
The primary charges leveled against this approach have been that cutting off our economic and other relations with South Africa could not force change, since the South Africans could survive such measures; and that we would therefore only be damaging our own economic interests while driving the white South Africans further behind a defensive and rigid shell.
Our own approach has been to try to make the following points clear to the South African Government.
We hope that a deterioration in American relations with South Africa can be avoided — this would not be in our interest or South Africa's.
We wish to work together with the
national commitment of the American people to the political, civil, and eco- nomic rights of every individual born on this Earth, as well as our standing in the international community and our long-term interests in the region, re- quire our disassociation from racial discrimination and a denial of basic human rights. We would prefer, of course, a future in which progress within South Africa allowed us to strengthen our ties to that country. Such a future would be better for the people of South Africa, for the region, and for us. It depends, as I have said, on the decisions of the South African Government.
Basic U.S. Efforts
Over the years, we have sought to encourage this peaceful change in four basic ways.
First, we have sought to demonstrate in constructive ways our strong com- mitment to racial equality.
• We have brought South African representatives of all races to the United States to obtain a first-hand un- derstanding of our outlook and our commitment to racial equality.
• Through investment guidelines, we have encouraged American firms in South Africa to follow fair employment
20
Department of State Bulletin
practices. And we have supported the Sullivan code.
• Our diplomatic representatives as a matter of policy have integrated their social functions.
Second, we have expressed our con- cern about the impact of apartheid on the lives of black South Africans and have sought to maintain ties with the black South African community.
• Our Embassy has been in the forefront among diplomatic missions in demonstrating opposition to political repression and support for black lead- ership.
• Ours was the only foreign ambas- sador to attend the funerals of Robert Sobukwe and Steve Biko.
• We have consistently protested detentions and bannings of political leaders.
• We have tried to keep in contact with students, labor and political lead- ers, religious leaders, and other rep- resentatives of the black community.
• We maintain a library in Soweto.
• We have provided refugee assist- ance for the students who have fled South Africa to Botswana and Lesotho.
ways that protect the rights of all indi- viduals, black and white — it could have a significant impact on how South Africans regard internal change.
Fourth, we have indicated to South Africa the fact that if it does not make significant progress toward racial equality, its relations with the interna- tional community, including the United States, are bound to deteriorate.
• Over the years, we have tried through a series of progressive steps to demonstrate that the United States can- not and will not be associated with the continued practice of apartheid.
• In 1962 the United States imposed a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa, strengthened in 1963.
• In 1964 we restricted Export- Import Bank (Eximbank) financing to South Africa to exclude any support for trade with the government and ended direct loans.
• In 1967 we terminated all U.S. naval ship visits to South African ports.
• In November of last year we sup- ported the U.N. mandatory arms em- bargo on South Africa. This February,
Our efforts to promote constructive and peaceful change have in- volved both cooperation and strong differences with South Africa. Over the years, the differences have grown as the problems in South Africa have grown.
Third, in encouraging the South Af- rican Government to work toward peaceful resolution of the Namibian and Rhodesian conflicts, we could have some impact on the nature of change in South Africa itself.
• These efforts demonstrate clearly the value of peaceful change as op- posed to mounting racial conflict. They also demonstrate our willingness to work cooperatively with the South Af- rican Government in implementing change.
• These negotiations show that there will be broad international support for efforts to bring peace and justice in southern Africa; and that the interna- tional community will work to find rea- sonable compromises in resolving these difficult problems.
• If change can be brought peace- fully in Rhodesia and Namibia — in
regulations were issued implementing our own decision to prohibit all sales of any kind to the South African military or police.
• We have recently tightened proce- dures on the sale of civilian aircraft to South Africa, to help assure that they will not be used for paramilitary pur- poses.
• Recently, Congress passed legis- lation further restricting Eximbank facilities for South Africa, stating that they could only be made available to firms which are proceeding toward im- plementation of fair employment prac- tices.
• And we have refused to recognize the "homelands" which the South Af- rican government has declared to be "independent."
There are limits to our ability to en-
courage change in South Africa. We cannot dictate a blueprint or a timetable for progress, nor should we. It is for the people of South Africa — both black and white — to determine their own fu- ture.
We have tried in such policies both to make clear that we cannot support apartheid and to demonstrate that we are concerned about the rights of all South Africans. It is not white South Africans as human beings that we op- pose but a system of racial separation and inequality. We believe that the best way to assure the future rights and se- curity of all South Africans is for them to begin a progressive transformation of that system.
In 1962 ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, an extraordinary leader and winner of the 1960 Nobel peace prize, wrote that a future of anguish and suffering for people of all races in South Africa could be avoided. "We seek no ven- geance," he wrote. "More than other continents, perhaps, and as much as any other nation on this continent, we need the ways of peace, the ways of industry, the ways of concord." "Will," he asked, "the outstretched hand be taken?"
Sixteen years have passed. Divisions run deeper. It is fundamentally in our interest to work all the more for the grasping of that hand, while it still may be offered.
The course I have described is the policy which we believe brings the best chance of encouraging the peaceful change so much in everyone's interest. It avoids. I believe, the dangers pre- sented either by policies which would convince South Africa's whites that we are implacably hostile to them, and that they must therefore go it alone without regard for our concerns or policies which falsely imply that we could ever be indifferent to the plight of the vic- tims of institutionalized racial injus- tice.
These are the best policies we have found. I do not pretend that they are the only possible policies, or that they will necessarily succeed. Our influence is limited. We must therefore use it with all the skill we can find. We must continue to put our minds to the com- plexities of issues that our hearts — as well as our brains — tell us are terribly important. That is why I look forward so much to hearing and learning from your comments today. □
January 1979
21
CANADA: Visit by Secretary Vance
Secretary Vance was in Ottawa November 21-22, 1978. Following is a news conference held by the Secretary and Secretary of State for External Af- fairs Donald Jamieson on Novem- ber 22. '
Minister Jamieson. Ladies and gentlemen, because we do not have an inordinate amount of time, I will keep the opening statement very short, being well aware that I will not be covering all the points that we dealt with today.
There were some 20-odd items on the agenda ranging from relatively small ones to perhaps the two biggest ones in bilateral terms — the question of the maritime boundaries and fisheries and the Alaska pipeline. We spent a good deal of time on each of these subjects, and, in both cases, I think I can report that there was substantial progress.
Because we have just finished, the statement relating to the boundaries question is not yet ready; but I can paraphrase it for you briefly and say that the Secretary and I have instructed our negotiators to complete the negoti- ations by the end of this year. We have given them a deadline by which to complete. We are quite satisfied, as a result of the talks that went on today, that we can make very significant progress by that time on a fisheries agreement, and we have indicated to the negotiators that if there are unresolved problems by the end of the year, they are to report these for disposal by the Secretary and by myself or by the two governments concerned. In other words, we have concluded that the process must be concluded by that time.
The only other point on which, again, I say I regrettably have to cut this short to give you some opportunity to ask questions of the Secretary is that on the pipeline both governments have reaffirmed their very strong support for the pipeline and their conviction that it is a most important project and that it can and indeed will go ahead as rapidly as possible.
I think beyond that I would be cut- ting too much into your time and the Secretary's. So perhaps I might ask Mr. Vance to say a word, simply, however, ending by expressing in a very genuine way what a pleasure it has been to have him with us and what a very worthwhile day it has been in terms of moving ahead on a wide range of Canada-U.S. matters as well those
matters on which we are mutually con- cerned on the international scene.
Secretary Vance. I want to echo what Don has said with respect to the usefulness of our discussions today and yesterday. We covered, as Don has said, a very wide variety of subjects which are of interest to us, both bilat- erally and internationally. We, I think, made good progress in our discussions. I also want to particularly mention the fact that I was most appreciative to have the opportunity to meet at lunch today with the Prime Minister and to discuss with him a number of subjects of broad international interest.
Again, Don, I want to express my thanks to you for inviting me to come to Ottawa and to be able to sit and meet with you and with your colleagues for what I consider to be a very fruitful meeting.
Q. You spoke last night in favor of a united Canada. The people of the Province of Quebec sometime next year will vote in a referendum bear- ing on the question of independence.
In the event that the people of Quebec and the majority voted at some point in favor of independence, how would the United States resolve the difficulty of respecting the right of the Quebec people to self- determination and its interests in defending a united Canada?
Secretary Vance. I do not want to speculate about what the future may or may not bring. I expressed my views about the importance of a united Canada. The question of what will be done is an internal matter for Canada, and I think it would be inappropriate for me to speculate about the future which none of us can predict at this point.
Q. A question to both Ministers with regard to Rhodesia. I wonder if you could give your reaction to Prime Minister Smith's decision to postpone majority rule and say whether you think it will have any effect in any way on the proposal, your proposal, the British-American proposal, for an all-parties confer- ence?
Secretary Vance. The proposal of Great Britain and the United States for an all-parties conference remains on the table. The problem of holding an
all-parties conference has become in- creasingly difficult because of actions taken on both sides. I give, for exam- ple, the shooting down of the Viscount plane by the patriotic front.
On the other hand, across-border raids by the Salisbury government have created problems on the other side, and as a result of this the chance of bring- ing the parties to the table for an all- parties conference has been greatly complicated at this particular period of time.
However, our proposals remain on the table. We shall remain in contact with the parties and see whether or not something can be brought to a conclu- sion. I think it is essential that a peaceful solution be found to this problem. If one is not found, in my judgment, the fighting will increase, the violence and the bloodshed will in- crease, and it will be not only tragic for the people of Rhodesia but also for the people of the region as well.
Q. Could I ask Mr. Jamieson to briefly give his reaction to Mr. Smith?
Minister Jamieson. There is nothing by way of a substantive difference be- tween Mr. Vance's views and mine. We discussed this today along with the whole question of southern Africa. Our Namibian initiative, which we both said today we must press on with, we believe it too is the most effective way to go; and indeed, if we can show in Namibia that a peaceful resolution is possible to one of these problems, it will have a salutary effect as far as Rhodesia is concerned.
Q. On the maritime boundary dis- pute, could I ask both of you to give us some appraisal of whether there have been any discussions concerning the naming of a third party, an in- ternational arbitrator, to resolve the Atlantic boundary?
Minister Jamieson. I said in the House some weeks ago and I repeat now that the prospect of one or more — the boundary questions being referred to a third party has always been there. We have always understood from the beginning that that was a pos- sibility.
When you get the statement — and it should be distributed shortly — you will see that basically what we are now concentrating on is a comprehensive fisheries agreement. We believe that if the fishermen and the fishing interests on both coasts are in a situation where they are satisfied with the arrangements that have been worked out to insure that their livelihoods are preserved — and that applies to fishermen of both
22
countries — then the boundary question as such, while not diminished in im- portance, certainly is diminished somewhat in urgency.
And, while there is a linkage be- tween these two issues — namely, the fisheries agreement and the ultimate disposition of the boundaries — the em- phasis, as you will see here in the statement, is on getting a fisheries agreement first because conceivably then that would give us more time to deal with the boundary question. But there is a clear linkage between the two.
Incidentally, Mr. Vance and I will be meeting again in Brussels at the time of NATO in about 10 days or so, and we would hope that we can take a further look at the situation then be- cause the negotiators will have met in the meantime.
Secretary Vance. I would say that I subscribe to what Mr. Jamieson has said, and I am very hopeful that by the time we meet in Brussels on the 7th and 8th of December, we will have ad- ditional information which may help us move forward more rapidly as a result of their conversations.2
Q. You mentioned a minute ago in regard to Canadian unity that you did not intend to interfere in the domestic policies of Canada. Nonetheless, we would like to know what was the anxiety that caused you to make that statement?
Secretary Vance. As I said last night, as an observer of the Canadian scene and as a close neighbor, we ob- viously follow with interest what is happening in your country. I, as the President has before me, wanted to in- dicate clearly that we believed it is im- portant that there be a united Canada but also to make clear that this is an internal matter, and we do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of Canada.
Q. Both sides of the question — a united Canada and an independent Quebec — have been lobbied in your country; one by Mr. Trudeau, the other by Mr. Levesque who has been several times to make speeches in support of the view of the Govern- ment of Quebec. Do you favor using the U.S. audience for lobbying what you call an internal question for Canada?
Secretary Vance. In the United States we believe very strongly in free- dom of speech, and anybody who comes to the United States certainly is welcome and free to express whatever views they wish to put forward.
Q. Your country takes a great interest in situations further away from it, notably the Middle East in which you played such a key part. How can you hold yourself aloof from a situation that may affect your security along the whole of your nothern border? How can you say that you want to stay aloof from that when you are so involved in Africa and the Middle East and every place else in the world?
Secretary Vance. With respect to the Middle East, all of the parties have asked us to work with them to try and help them find a solution to that prob- lem. We have been willing to do so and, I believe and hope, have played a constructive role in that respect.
Q. On the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, which has been made essentially more stringent, what reason for optimism do you have that you are going to be able to clean up the Great Lakes, consider- ing the record of the companies in- volved so far?
Minister Jamieson. I don't think that either Mr. Vance or I are scientifi- cally minded enough to give you a very specific answer on that. I can only an- swer against the record which we heard something about today and which indi- cated that there have been considerable improvements in many areas of pollu- tion since the 1972 agreement was signed. I think perhaps you would have to ask the experts what other measures they now feel will help the matter still further. We did hear today that there had been a very considerable improve- ment in the situation.
I appreciate, by the way, the ques- tion because it reminds me to make another announcement or comment about our meetings today which I had neglected to say; namely, that we have now undertaken to engage at once in talks with regard to air pollution. And these talks will begin hopefully before the end of the present year. This is a new element of the border problem which we are now prepared to tackle.
Q. Could you say please what progress if any you have made to stop the government bidding war for investment under the auto pact?
Secretary Vance. We discussed at length the auto pact, and we are awaiting the report of the Royal Com- mission which I believe will be forth- coming in the very near future. Ob- viously the first thing which we will wish to do is to study that report very carefully. There have been discussions going on between the Assistant Secre-
Department of State Bulletin
tary of State for Economic and Busi- ness Affairs and his counterpart in the Foreign Ministry here. Once we have had a chance to inform ourselves with respect to the report and the recom- mendations and suggestions that are made there, we will pick up the discus- sions and proceed to try and make progress in clearing away the differ- ences that exist.
Minister Jamieson. To add to that, in the discussion this afternoon the Canadian view was expressed that the American Ambassador, Mr. Enders, had made a point, with which we agreed, in a recent speech in which he talked about the desirability of ending the so-called bidding war to which you referred. So I think there is a basis there for moving toward a more formal means through which that can be achieved.
Q. There is no agreement —
Minister Jamieson. No, not at the moment because, of course, there are so many elements in play, not the least of which are the multilateral trade negotiations which have an element of countervail and that type of thing in them and, of course, the inability of our government on the one hand and the U.S. Government on the other to totally bind Provinces and States unless we have some mechanism by which we can do so and that I would acknowl- edge does not exist at the moment.
Q. Since you have set the deadline on the fisheries and boundaries agreement, what happens if the negotiators do not reach an agree- ment? And, secondly, you have mentioned that the Alaska pipeline is one of the key bilateral issues. Would you tell us a little more about what are the outstanding issues concerning the Alaska pipeline?
Minister Jamieson. On the
fisheries, first of all it is not always wise to be a prophet in these matters. But the point with regard to the dead- line was that Mr. Vance and I con- cluded this morning that there was enough light in sight that there is no inordinate reason to be worried about a settlement on a fisheries agreement, and that is one of the reasons why we felt confident in putting a deadline on them.
The second one was, of course, that these matters always proceed more ef- fectively if everyone knows that there is a specific cut-off date. In order to in- sure that that date is not passed this time, we have said: "OK, do as much as you can. " And we think that will be very considerable. If there are out-
January 1979
23
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 1978
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Canadian Secretary of State for Exter- nal Affairs Donald Jamieson on November 22, 1978, signed a revised agreement between Canada and the United States on water quality of the Great Lakes.
The new U.S. -Canada agreement reaffirms the determination of both countries to restore and enhance Great Lakes water quality. It was signed by Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Vance in a brief ceremony at the Lester B. Pearson Building, headquarters of the Depart- ment of External Affairs in Ottawa.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 1978 brings up to date the provisions contained in the original agreement signed in Ottawa in April 1972. That agreement has resulted in considerable progress toward im- provement of Great Lakes water qual- ity. Under its terms, a review was to be undertaken within 5 years to see how effectively it was working and where improvements could be made.
The review was carried out by U.S. and Canadian negotiators, with the ad- vice and recommendations of the Inter-
national Joint Commission, and with involvement of the eight Great Lakes States, the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and the public in both coun- tries.
The new agreement strengthens the 1972 agreement by calling for various additional programs and measures to meet problems in Great Lakes pollution which were not evident or fully under- stood at the time. It includes:
• Programs to strengthen and renew the commitment of both countries to control pollution from municipal and industrial sources;
• More effective control of persist- ent toxic substances and other pollut- ants;
• Identification of airborne pollut- ants entering the Great Lakes;
• Identification and control of pol- lution from agricultural, forestry, and other land-use activities;
• Better surveillance and monitoring mechanisms;
• Provisions aimed at further reduc- ing phosphorus loadings; and
• Placing new limits on radioactiv- ity.
standing issues at that time, don't con- tinue the negotiations in an effort to solve those. In effect, put them in the lap of the two responsible ministers, and we will have to cope with them from there.
On the pipeline, I suppose the most important element now is this issue of the incremental pricing arrangement on which some of you who have been following that are familiar, where there are studies going on and representa- tions being made. That is essentially, I guess, the most important single key issue in that regard.
Secretary Vance. I have nothing further to add except that we both, as Don Jamieson has said, support very, very strongly the importance of moving forward with this and making a success of the project.
Q. I just wanted to ask whether the report that Canada and the United States are talking about some sort of a trade-off between the Beaufort Sea and the Dickson En- trance is accurate. Are you talking about that, and what sort of a
trade-off were you speaking about at this time?
Minister Jamieson. I do not recall having used the word trade-off.
Q. An exchange of whatever it is.
Minister Jamieson. We did not
today try to set up any single formula- tion. I emphasized at the beginning that there is a fisheries issue which is vital and immediate: How do you apportion the fish stock so that each side feels that they are getting a reasonable ac- cess? I believe, and I think Secretary Vance agrees, that once we have that settled or once that is in place, to put it crudely, how you draw a line on the bottom of the ocean ceases to have the same urgency and immediacy although no less important. So we did not get into the idea of whether there were going to be, to use your expression, trade-offs against Beaufort Sea or west coast-east coast; those were not the sorts of things that we spent our time discussing. □
1 Press release 434.
2Subsequently Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher attended the NATO meeting.
The valuable role of the International Joint Commission in monitoring the implementation of the agreement will be continued.
The agreement was cosigned by Len Marchand, Canada's Minister of State (Environment), and Barbara Blum, Deputy Administrator of the U.S. En- vironmental Protection Agency. Dr. Harry Parrot, Minister of the Environ- ment of the Province of Ontario, also took part in the ceremony.
The 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement represented significant progress in coordinated environmental management by Canada and the United States. Since its signature, both coun- tries have devoted great effort and sub- stantial resources to the restoration and enhancement of water quality in the Great Lakes. While much remains to be done, there is no doubt that benefits to both users of the water and the general public have been great.
In its fifth annual report on Great Lakes water quality, the International Joint Commission concluded that the continued degradation of the lakes has been substantially checked and that the development of coordinated programs of research, surveillance, and remedial measures has been a major accom- plishment of the two governments.
The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement builds on 6 years of experi- ence under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972. Since it came into effect, there has been a sig- nificant improvement in understanding of the technical and scientific aspect of water quality, the presence and effects of toxic substances in the Great Lakes system, and the extent of nonpoint source pollution. Thus the 1978 agree- ment contains the following significant revisions or improvements over the 1972 agreement:
• Provision of revised and new water quality objectives, both general and specific;
• Provisions to largely eliminate dis- charge of toxic substances into the Great Lakes and to establish warning systems which will point up those that may become evident;
• Dates on which municipal (De- cember 31, 1982) and industrial (De- cember 31, 1983) pollution control programs are to be completed and operating are set;
• Improved monitoring and surveil- lance requirements to enable assess- ment of the effectiveness of remedial programs;
• Provisions for dealing with pollu- tion from land-use activities and for examining the problem of airborne pollutants;
24
Department of State Bulletin
• A definition of new, interim phos- phorus loadings with provisions for an 18-month review and new strategies for controlling phosphorus as necessary; and
• Provision for an annual public in- ventory of discharges and pollution control requirements.
The agreement states the purpose of the two signatories to be a commitment to a maximum effort to obtain a better understanding of the Basin ecosystem and to reduce or eliminate the dis- charge of pollutants into the system, with a prohibition on the discharge of toxic pollutants. This purpose is to be met through programs which, as under the original agreement, have general and specific objectives. General objec- tives are broad descriptions of desirable water quality conditions, while specific objectives are designations of maximum or minimum desired levels of a substance or effect, to protect the beneficial uses of the waters.
Among the general objectives are keeping the waters free from:
• Sewage discharges, oil, and other debris;
• Materials which adversely affect color, odor, taste, or other conditions; and
• Materials which produce toxic conditions or provide nutrients for the growth of algae which interfere with the beneficial uses of the Lakes.
The lengthy list of specific objec- tives, detailed in annex 1 of the agree- ment, provides that specified levels or concentrations of persistent or nonper- sistent chemical and physical sub- stances not be exceeded to the injury of property and health. Based on work by experts in both countries under the aus- pices of the Great Lakes Water Quality Board of the International Joint Com- mission, the specific objectives of the 1978 agreement are far more com- prehensive and stringent than those of the 1972 agreement.
The agreement outlines a number of programs which are necessary to meet the general and specific objectives. Among these are programs which call for:
• The preparation of an inventory of pollution abatement requirements, ex- pressed as effluent limitations;
• Controls to be placed on the use of pest control products to limit their input into the Lakes; require control of pollution from animal husbandry oper- ations and from the hauling and dis- posal of liquid and solid wastes. Other measures will be required in connection with land-use activities in an effort to
reduce this significant contribution to Lakes' pollution;
• The establishment of measures to control pollution from shipping sources, including both oil and vessel waste discharges;
• The continuation of the joint pol- lution contingency plan for the Lakes;
• Measures for control of pollution from dredging activities and the dis- posal of polluted dredge sediments;
• Measures for the control of pollu- tion from onshore and offshore facilities, such as materials transporta- tion within the Basin, and gas drilling operations;
• Additional protection for pollution from hazardous polluting substances and toxic chemicals;
• The introduction of measures for the control of inputs of phosphorus and other nutrients to prevent harmful algal growth;
• A program aimed at identifying the contribution of airborne pollutants to the Lakes; and
• The further implementation of a coordinated surveillance and monitor- ing program to determine the extent to which the general and specific objec- tives are being achieved.
The International Joint Commission will continue to play an important role under the 1978 agreement. It will assist governments in implementing the agreement by tendering advice; col- lecting, analyzing, and disseminating data; and undertaking public informa- tion activities. In addition, the Com- mission will send a full report to gov- ernments on the progress toward achievement of the general and specific objectives every other year. The 1978 agreement also specifies more precisely the terms of reference of the joint in- stitutions established to assist the Commission in performing functions related to the agreement. □
Press release 432 of Nov. 22. 1978.
DEPARTMENT: Y<*ir Liaison Office
With I .S. State and Local
Governments
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV.
16'
The President today announced his intention to nominate W. Beverly Car- ter, Jr., to be Ambassador at Large to head a new State Department Office for Liaison with State and Local Govern- ments. Mr. Carter, 57, of Philadelphia, Pa., is Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia.
As head of the Office for Liaison with State and Local Governments, Ambassador Carter will report directly to the Secretary of State, and will also work closely with Jack Watson, Assist- ant to the President for Inter- governmental Affairs.
The responsibilities of the new office will include facilitating state and local governments' priority international interests; arranging briefings and other communications for governors and key local government leaders on interna- tional issues of special interest to them and conveying their views on such is- sues to the President and the Secretary of State; assisting senior state and local government officials in planning their official overseas travel and the visits of foreign officials; coordinating assign- ments with state and local governments
for Foreign Service officers; and de- veloping the State Department's capabilities to identify and to report to state and local governments on how other societies at the national or subna- tional level understand and resolve common problems of major impor- tance.
Prior to his present assignment in Liberia, Mr. Carter served as Ambas- sador to Tanzania (1972-1975) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (1969-1972). A career Foreign Service information officer, he has served in public affairs and area positions in both the former U.S. In- formation Agency and the State De- partment.
David H. Shinn has been selected as deputy to Ambassador Carter and will be in charge of the new office until Mr. Carter's return in mid-January. Mr. Shinn, a career Foreign Service Officer, was most recently detailed to the mayor's office in Seattle under the Pear- son amendment domestic assignment program. □
•Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- dential Documents of Nov. 20, 1978.
January 1979
25
EAST ASIA: U.S. Normalizes Relations With the People's Republic of China
Following are the texts of December 15. 1978, of the joint communique be- tween the United States and the People's Republic of China, President Carter's address to the nation and re- marks to reporters following the ad- dress, and the U.S. statement on nor- malization. '
PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS :
I would like to read a joint com- munique which is being simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by the leaders of the People *s Republic of China.
[At this point, the President read the text of the joint communique.]
Yesterday, our country and the People's Republic of China reached this final historic agreement. On January 1, 1979, a little more than 2 weeks from now, our two governments will implement full normalization of diplomatic relations.
As a nation of gifted people who comprise about one-fourth of the total population of the Earth, China plays, already, an important role in world af- fairs, a role that can only grow more important in the years ahead.
We do not undertake this important step for transient tactical or expedient reasons. In recognizing the People's Republic of China, that it is the single Government of China, we are recog- nizing simple reality. But far more is involved in this decision than just the recognition of a fact.
Before the estrangement of recent decades, the American and the Chinese people had a long history of friendship. We've already begun to rebuild some of those previous ties. Now our rapidly expanding relationship requires the kind of structure that only full diplo- matic relations will make possible.
The change that I'm announcing to- night will be of great long-term benefit to the peoples of both our country and China — and, I believe, to all the peoples of the world. Normalization — and the expanded commercial and cul- tural relations that it will bring — will contribute to the well-being of our own nation, to our own national interest, and it will also enhance the stability of Asia. These more positive relations with China can beneficially affect the world in which we live and the world
in which our children will live.
We have already begun to inform our allies and other nations and the Mem- bers of the Congress of the details of our intended action. But I wish also to- night to convey a special message to the people of Taiwan — I have already communicated with the leaders in Taiwan — with whom the American people have had and will have exten- sive, close, and friendly relations. This is important between our two peoples.
As the United States asserted in the Shanghai communique of 1972, 3 issued on President Nixon's historic visit, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. I have paid special attention to insuring that normalization of relations between our country and the People's Republic will not jeopardize the well- being of the people of Taiwan. The people of our country will maintain our current commercial, cultural, trade, and other relations with Taiwan through nongovernmental means. Many other countries in the world are already successfully doing this.
These decisions and these actions open a new and important chapter in our country's history and also in world affairs .
To strengthen and to expedite the benefits of this new relationship be-
tween China and the United States, I am pleased to announce that Vice Pre- mier Teng has accepted my invitation and will visit Washington at the end of January. His visit will give our gov- ernments the opportunity to consult with each other on global issues and to begin working together to enhance the cause of world peace.
These events are the final result of long and serious negotiations begun by President Nixon in 1972 and continued under the leadership of President Ford. The results bear witness to the steady, determined, bipartisan effort of our own country to build a world in which peace will be the goal and the respon- sibility of all nations.
The normalization of relations be- tween the United States and China has no other purpose than this: the ad- vancement of peace. It is in this spirit, at this season of peace, that I take spe- cial pride in sharing this good news with you tonight.
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS4
I wanted to come by and let you know that I believe this to be an ex- tremely important moment in the his- tory of our nation. It's something that I and my two predecessors have sought
JOINT COMMUNIQUE, DEC. 15
JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
JANUARY 1, 1979
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to rec- ognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.
The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unof- ficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the princi- ples agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and emphasize once again that:
• Both wish to reduce the danger of interna- tional military conflict.
• Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia- Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
• Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
• The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
• Both believe that normalization of Sino- American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Am- bassadors and establish Embassies on March 1 . 1979.
26
Department of State Bulletin
avidly. We have maintained our own U.S. position firmly, and only since the last few weeks has there been an increasing demonstration to us that Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng have been ready to normalize relations. I think the interests of Taiwan have been adequately protected. One of the briefers will explain the details to you.
Our Ambassador there. [Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office] Leonard Wood- cock, has done a superb job in pre- senting our own views strongly and clearly to the officials of the People's Republic of China. I will be preparing myself adequately for the visit of Vice Premier Teng. We invited him on one day; he accepted the next, without delay; and I think he's looking forward to this trip with a great deal of antici- pation and pleasure.
I have talked personally this evening to Prime Minister Ohira [of Japan]. Early this morning we notified the offi- cials in Taiwan, and we have also notified many of the leaders around the world of this long-awaited development in international diplomacy.
I think that one of the greatest bene- fits that will be derived from this is the continuation of strong trade, cultural relationships with Taiwan — the people of Taiwan — and a new vista for pros- perous trade relationships with almost a billion people in the People's Republic of China. This is also, of course, en- hanced by the new opportunities for us to understand the people of China, and to work avidly for peace in that region and for world peace.
This afternoon the Soviet Union of- ficials were notified through their Am- bassador here, Mr. Dobrynin. And I think the Soviets were familiar with the fact that we were anticipating normali- zation whenever the Chinese were willing to meet our reasonable terms, and they were not surprised. As you well know, the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China have dip- lomatic relations between themselves.
My own assessment is that this will be well received in almost every nation of the world, perhaps all of them, be- cause it will add to stability. And the Soviets and others know full well, be- cause of our own private explanations to them, not just recently but in months gone by, that we have no desire what- soever to use our new relationships with China to the disadvantage of the Soviets or anyone else. We believe this will enhance stability and not cause in- stability in Asia and the rest of the world.
I'm very pleased with it. And I ob- viously have to give a major part of the
credit to President Nixon and to Presi- dent Ford, who laid the groundwork for this successful negotiation. And most of the premises that were spelled out in the Shanghai communique 6 years ago or more have been implemented now.
You can tell that I'm pleased, and I know that the world is waiting for your accurate explanation of the results.
Q. How did the congressional leaders take it?
A. With mixed response. Some of the congressional leaders who were there have long been very strong per- sonal friends of the officials in Taiwan. They are not as thoroughly familiar with the officials in the People's Re- public of China.
One of the most long-debated issues was whether or not we would peremptorily terminate our defense treaty with Taiwan, or whether we would terminate that treaty in accord- ance with its own provisions. And the People's Republic officials agreed with our position that we would give Taiwan a 1-year notice and that the defense treaty would prevail throughout 1979. I think that alleviated some of the con- cerns among the Senators.
And another concern expressed by them was whether or not we could continue cultural relationships, trade relationships with the people of Taiwan. I assured them that we could, that the Chinese knew this. And we will ask the Congress for special legis- lation quite early in the session to per- mit this kind of exchange with the people of Taiwan. This would include authorization for the Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation to guarantee and to help with specific trade negotiations.
I think that many of their concerns have been alleviated, although there certainly will be some Members of the Congress who feel that we should have maintained the status quo.
Q. You said the response to your speech would be "massive applause throughout the nation." What do you think the response to your speech will be in Taiwan?
A. I doubt if there will be massive applause in Taiwan, but we are going to do everything we can to assure the Taiwanese that we put at top — as one of the top priorities in our own re- lationships with the People's Republic and them — that the well-being of the people of Taiwan will not be damaged.
To answer the other question, I don't think this will have any adverse effect at all on the SALT [Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks] negotiations as an independent matter. And I think that the Soviets, as I said earlier, have been expecting this development. They were not surprised, and we have kept them informed recently. Their reaction has not been adverse, and we will proceed aggressively as we have in recent months, in fact throughout my own Administration, to conclude a suc- cessful SALT agreement.
U.S. STATEMENT
As of January I, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date, the People's Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby estab- lishes diplomatic relations with the People's Re- public of China.
On that same date. January 1. 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being termi- nated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months.
In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplo- matic relations.
The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the mainte- nance of commercial, cultural, and other non- governmental relationships in the new circum- stances that will exist after normalization.
The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.
The United States believes that the establish- ment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and eco- nomic interest, and to the peace of the entire world. D
'Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presi- dential Documents of Dec. 18, 1978.
2The address was broadcast live on radio and television from the Oval Office at the White House.
"For text of the Shanghai communique, see Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435.
4Held with reporters in the White House Briefing Room. Following the President's re- marks. Administration officials held a back- ground briefing on the announcement.
January 1979
27
ECONOMICS: The Role of Exports in ZJ.S. Foreign Policy
by Warren Christopher
Address before the 65th National Foreign Trade Convention in New York on November 13, 1978. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.
I am pleased to have an opportunity to talk with you today about the re- lationship of U.S. exports to our foreign policy. I approach this subject as "a staunch advocate of global commerce," to use President Carter's phrase. I want to divide my discussion into two parts: first, to describe why expanding U.S. exports is important to our foreign policy and how we are going about it; and second, to explain how we are trying to integrate this goal of expanding exports with other fun- damental foreign policy objectives.
For the vast majority of our exports, we have only one basic foreign policy objective — to encourage and assist them. For these exports, there are no other competing foreign policy inter- ests that must be taken into account, and our efforts can be concentrated on assisting U.S. exporters in selling abroad and on working to reduce foreign trade barriers.
At the Bonn summit last summer, the United States and our major indus- trial partners agreed to a coordinated strategy for economic progress. An es- sential element in this strategy is to ex- pand U.S. exports. Increased exports will reduce our trade deficit and strengthen the dollar abroad, which in turn will help fight inflation at home.
At the same time, increased exports promote essential political relationships abroad. A strong U.S. economy and a sound dollar are crucial to maintain the confidence of our allies. Moreover, the bonds of trade and commerce strengthen ties with our friends and help to lessen tensions with others.
Like the other important economic tasks you will discuss here, improving our export performance will require a major long-term effort from business and from government. I believe the program President Carter recently an- nounced is an important contribution to this joint effort. That program includes a number of significant measures.
• It provides additional funds for Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) financing and agricultural export cred- its.
• It expands export development programs to help U.S. firms, particu- larly small and medium businesses, in marketing abroad.
• It reaffirms our key objectives in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), such as reducing both tariff and nontariff trade barriers and limit- ing the use of government subsidies for exports.
• It launches efforts outside the MTN for a more widespread interna- tional agreement to limit excessive government financing for exports.
• It seeks to insure that exporters have clear guidelines on the application of our laws relating to foreign bribery, antitrust, and environmental matters.
Taken together, these measures will increase direct assistance to U.S. ex- porters and reduce foreign and domes- tic barriers to exports.
The strength of the President's com- mitment to this program is reflected by actions he has taken in the last few days. He signed into law a bill in- creasing Eximbank 's financing author- ity from $25 to $40 billion and ex- tending the Bank's charter for 5 years. He also vetoed protectionist measures
some countries — Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea, Southern Rhodesia, and, as a result of legislation enacted in the last Congress, Uganda. But these broad prohibitions are the ex- ception, not the rule.
For example, last year there were well over 50,000 applications for licenses to export controlled items other than military equipment. Fewer than 350 of these license applications were denied — only about two-thirds of 1% of all applications. Of the more than 50,000 licenses that were ap- proved, all but about 1,300 — or about 2Vz% — were approved in less than 90 days.
I recognize that other applications may not have been submitted because exporters believed that licenses would not be issued. But I also think that an approval ratio of more than 999c for these applications shows that in our balancing of foreign policy interests, the scale is not rigged against exports.
Second, the primary reason for im- posing trade controls is to maintain our national security. While our concern with Communist countries remains a dominant theme, our concept of na- tional security has evolved in recent
Winning a larger share of world trade for our exporters is important to the strength of our economy and to the perception of American lead- ership throughout the world.
relating to meat and textile imports, demonstrating his commitment to pres- ervation of an open world trading sys- tem and to successful conclusion of the MTN at the earliest possible date.
Foreign Policy Concerns
Turning to the second aspect of my approach, let me change my focus and consider the narrow categories of ex- ports where it is necessary to balance our strong interest in promoting exports with other fundamental foreign policy interests — in short, the small fraction of our exports which is subject to con- trols. Before I discuss some of the spe- cific areas where these controls apply, let me offer some general observations.
First, controls should not be equated with prohibitions. Of course, the United States does embargo trade with
years to include a concern with the spread of nuclear explosives and the sale of highly sophisticated conven- tional weapons. The character of our export controls has evolved along with this changing concept. As we have ex- tended new controls to promote new objectives, we have relaxed controls in other areas where their use has become less essential.
Third, the overwhelming majority of the exports subject to controls are military related. A large portion of these exports are arms or other military equipment. Congress and the American people have understandably required us to apply close supervision to military sales abroad, while leaving almost all nonmilitary exports free of controls. Occasionally, of course, the line be- tween military and nonmilitary exports is blurred by dual-use items, such as
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nuclear technology or highly sophisti- cated computers, that have both com- mercial and military applications. Some of these dual-use items are also subject to controls. But where they are controlled, Congress has mandated fewer specific prohibitions than for arms sales, and we in the executive branch operate with a strong presump- tion in favor of allowing the exports.
Let me turn now to consider briefly five important areas in which controls apply.
East-West Trade. The first is East-West trade. For the past three decades, the dominant element in our system of export controls has been re- strictions on trade with Communist countries. In the period after World War II, our export controls reflected our overriding concern with the threat from the Soviet Union. In coordination with our NATO allies, we prohibited exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of a wide range of industrial products and technology that could have a military application. Similar national security concerns, and in some cases armed hostilities, led to adoption of embargoes on trade with North Korea, North Vietnam, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Cuba.
As cold war tensions have lessened, restrictions on these nonmilitary ex- ports have been relaxed. We have re- duced the number of items subject to restriction and narrowed the criteria for determining whether an export could affect our national security. We are now considering the removal of con- trols on a variety of additional prod- ucts, while continuing to control transfers of critical technologies used to manufacture these products.
As a result of this liberalization of controls and other factors, our exports
with the Soviet Union and the PRC. A number of Cabinet-level delegations have visited the PRC to discuss in- creasing economic cooperation in energy, agriculture, and other areas. Secretary [of Energy James R.] Schlesinger has just returned and Sec- retary [of Agriculture Bob] Bergland is there now. On the Soviet side, we hope that the trip by Secretaries [of the Treasury W. Michael] Blumenthal and [of Commerce Juanita M.] Kreps to Moscow next month for an important set of trade meetings will provide fur- ther opportunities for expansion of trade .
Nuclear-Weapons Technology. A
second area of controls relates to the increasing danger to our security from the spread of nuclear-weapons technol- ogy. Twenty years ago, there were only three nuclear-weapon nations. Today, there are more than a dozen nations which could develop a nuclear weapon within 2 years of a decision to do so. On taking office. President Carter con- cluded that this problem would no longer be left on the back burner of American foreign policy.
As a result, while we continue to en- courage peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we are making important new efforts to prevent the spread of the capacity to make nuclear explosives. We supported legislation enacted ear- lier this year to tighten controls on nu- clear exports. And we have taken a number of steps, including streamlined licensing procedures, to facilitate ex- ports of nuclear reactors and fuel to countries that share our nonprolifera- tion objectives.
We have not limited ourselves to measures affecting our own nuclear ex- ports. We have worked to develop and strengthen a common set of guidelines
The basic foreign policy purpose which exports serve is to improve the trade balance, strengthen the dollar, and build closer relations with our trading partners. Any restriction on exports for other foreign policy purposes bears a heavy burden of proof .
to the Soviet Union increased more than tenfold between 1970 and 1977. We are committed to continuing the growth of East- West trade. Secretary Vance has made clear our view that trade can perform a useful function in easing tensions in our relationships with the Soviet Union and other coun- tries.
Speaking to the International Chamber of Commerce last month. President Carter reaffirmed his deter- mination to increase trade substantially
for nuclear exports accepted by the major nuclear suppliers. We have brought together 44 nations to explore safer nuclear energy alternatives. And we have tried to persuade a number of countries that their energy needs can be met with safe nuclear energy technol- ogies.
Conventional Arms Sales. A third area of controls involves the dangers posed by the spread of advanced con- ventional weapons systems. Since
Department of State Bulletin
1970, arms suppliers have made com- mitments totaling about S140 billion to developing countries. When these arms are delivered, they will change the face of world politics. For the first time, many states throughout the world will have arms of much the same sophisti- cation and quality as those of the major powers.
While the need for restraint on con- ventional arms sales has become in- creasingly clear, the fact remains that important foreign policy interests re- quire arms transfers in certain cases. The problem is how to strike the ap- propriate balance.
This requires a closer scrutiny of arms sales to insure that they do serve an important foreign policy interest. Congress has enacted legislation in re- cent years mandating this closer examination. In addition. President Carter has imposed a ceiling on arms sales to Third World countries, where resources are scarce and the pos- sibilities for armed conflict are many. We have also developed guidelines to limit the sophistication of arms exports to these countries.
In this effort, we recognize that U.S. action alone cannot achieve meaningful restraint. So we have gone to other nations — both suppliers and pur- chasers— to persuade them to join us. It is a long road, but we are encouraged by the prospects that joint efforts can ease the heavy burden of armaments.
Human Rights. The fourth and fifth aspects of foreign policy that give rise to export controls — human rights and antiterrorism concerns — have a much smaller impact on U.S. exports, both in terms of countries and dollar amounts.
The promotion of human rights is a fundamental tenet of the foreign policy of the Carter Administration. We be- lieve our underlying principles and values must be reflected in American foreign policy if that policy is to have the support of our people and if it is to be effective. The pursuit of this cause is not an ideological luxury cruise with no practical port of call. Widening the circle of countries which share our human rights values is at the very core of our security interests, because such nations make strong allies.
In our efforts to promote human rights, we are using a wide range of tools — private diplomatic approaches in our bilateral relations with other countries; public statements where pri- vate approaches are unavailable or un- availing; multilateral approaches in the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the International De- velopment Banks, and elsewhere; and adjustment of our foreign assistance
January 1979
programs to take into account human rights conditions in the recipient coun- tries.
We strongly prefer to use positive measures, but where these have no ef- fect, we must consider restrictions on the flow of our military and economic aid. In some instances, our human rights policy has involved restrictions on U.S. exports, although here, as in other areas of export controls, it is al- most entirely military-related sales which are affected. And here again we are implementing our policy in collab- oration and consultation with Con- gress, which has specified areas where human rights considerations must be brought to bear on exports.
We are attempting to comply with the letter and spirit of the law that pro- hibits, except in "extraordinary cir- cumstances," sales of military equip- ment to countries where there are gross and consistent human rights violations. Congress strengthened that prohibition this year and extended it to cover ex- ports of police equipment. Moreover, Congress has become sufficiently con- cerned about human rights conditions in several countries that it has prohib- ited all military sales in any circum- stances to those countries. In addition, the United States has complied with the arms embargo imposed on South Africa by the United Nations last year and taken the further step of prohibiting all U.S. exports to the South African police or military.
Antiterrorism Efforts. A fifth as- pect of our foreign policy affecting U.S. exports is our effort to combat international terrorism. Like our human rights policy, our antiterrorism efforts involve the restriction of only a rela- tively small dollar volume of exports, to only a relatively few countries. Existing legislation restricts military sales to countries that harbor terrorists, and proposed legislation would bar many nonmilitary exports to a wider range of countries that support ter- rorism. Here again we recognize that to be effective, our efforts must be mul- tilateral. A major step in international cooperation on this problem was taken at the Bonn summit, where the par- ticipating countries pledged to termi- nate air service with any country that harbors aircraft hijackers.
Limitations on U.S. Government Financing
Let me turn from discussing controls on exports to a different but related subject — limitations not on actual ex- port transactions but on U.S. Govern- ment financing for our exports.
Whether restrictions on export
financing should be used to further these or other foreign policy objectives is a difficult question. On the one hand, export financing is provided by the U.S. Government, usually on generous terms and often as a direct loan to a foreign government. There- fore it is viewed by some as a proper instrument for pursuing noncommercial U.S. interests, much as foreign assist- ance programs are used. On the other hand, the primary reason for providing export financing is to enable U.S. ex- porters to compete with other trading nations. Therefore, others argue, it is an integral part of purely commercial transactions that should not be inter- fered with on foreign policy grounds.
There is undoubtedly merit to each side of this debate. But the fact is that Congress has enacted specific lim- itations on Export-Import Bank financing to reflect each of the five foreign policy concerns I have dis- cussed in connection with export con- trols. In carrying out these legal re- quirements, we believe that restrictions on export financing should be used for foreign policy reasons only in highly exceptional circumstances.
Let me illustrate this point using human rights restrictions as an exam- ple. Since 1974 Eximbank has been prohibited by law from financing ex- ports to Communist countries which re- strict the right of their citizens to emigrate. This year the Congress fur- ther restricted the Bank's authority to finance exports to South Africa. But aside from these specific statutory pro- hibitions, there are only two other countries in which human rights prob- lems have led the Bank to refuse to make loans.
Problems of Export Controls
This has been a very brief review of the categories of exports in which the strong presumption in favor of exports must be balanced against other impor- tant foreign policy interests. I hope that the review has demonstrated that these categories are extremely limited when compared to our overall exports of more than $120 billion. And within these categories, the balancing does not often result in denials or substantial delays of exports. Nevertheless, we in government recognize that any such denials or delays create hardships and difficulties for U.S. companies seeking to sell abroad. Here are some specific problems that inevitably arise with any set of export controls.
Difficult Cost/Benefit Assessments.
One problem is the difficulty of as- sessing the costs and benefits of any particular restriction. We can calculate
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the cost of any one lost sale, but we can not readily calculate how many sales are lost because a denial of one transaction may discourage potential buyers and sellers from coming for- ward with other transactions.
It is equally difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of any denial in promot- ing a particular foreign policy objec- tive. One important reason for this dif- ficulty is the possibility that the item can be purchased from a supplier in another country.
It is clear that the more countries that participate in an export sanction, the more effective that sanction will be. Many of the export restrictions I have discussed have been adopted by other countries. In other instances, we are making determined efforts to obtain multilateral support — for example, in our arms transfer and nonproliferation policies.
Of course we will continue to take into account the availability of a prod- uct from other foreign suppliers before we decide to restrict its export. But foreign availability cannot be disposi- tive in all cases. We cannot commit ourselves to permit exports wherever some other exporter can be found who is willing to make the sale. There will be cases where the United States must take the first step in restricting a sale and then encourage others to follow.
There are also instances where the use of export restrictions serves pur- poses beyond preventing another coun- try from getting the product involved. For example, terrorist organizations will be able to buy submachine guns even if the United States refuses to sell them. But nonetheless we will continue to refuse to sell such equipment to countries that support international terrorism.
To give us a better measure of our policies, we are presently engaged in a systematic review of the costs and benefits of export restrictions. One way to improve this assessment is a closer exchange of views between government and business. President Carter has re- constituted a more broadly based ex- port council to assist in this exchange, and we want to encourage other means to this end.
Uncertain Effects of Controls.
Another problem inherent in the use of export controls is uncertainty over what exports will be affected. There are a few situations where broad prohibitions on exports are required — for example, a wartime embargo.
In many cases, however, the need to balance a number of important foreign policy interests, including a strong pre- sumption in favor of exports, calls for
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The U.S. and the Third World: Partners or Plaintiffs
by David D. Newsom
Address before the International Relations Section of the Common- wealth Club and the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San